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Introduction
Maritime air power is an important but often neglected concept of air warfare, 
operationally as well as doctrinally. It has suffered because it principally 
involves both sea and air power, and therefore has often fallen between the 
Service’s sphere of interests, and simultaneously been haunted by inter-service 
rivalry.
There are universally recognised theorists of sea power and universally 
recognised theorists of air power, but their ideas and perceptions exist in 
different theoretical, historical and bureaucratic spheres. Navies think in terms 
of sea power, air forces think in terms of air power. Naval academies teach sea 
power, air force academies teach air power. An important question arising from 
this is which service ‘owns’ the aircraft that operate at sea. In addition, these 
theories or paradigms of sea power and air power argue for the primacy of their 
subject: air power on its own is the war winner, or sea power on its own is the 
war winner. Maritime air power is caught between these two extremes. 
Maritime air power is fundamentally about sea power – but it is also 
air power applied. It is a two-service and joint affair.  As maritime air power 
comprises both sea and air power, much literature has been obscured by the 
many naval and air force advocates. This book includes a reproduction of eight 
formerly classified essays by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Trenchard and 
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Slessor. The essays are reproduced for three main 
reasons: Trenchard and Slessor are two of the most influential and important 
figures of Royal Air Force (RAF) and air power history. All of the essays fall 
into the category ‘air force extremes’ in terms of the classical air force–navy 
controversies over air power. These essays should therefore be made available 
to students and other readers interested in air and sea power. The essays provide 
fascinating and interesting reading, as well as a good starting point for debates 
on and studies of maritime air power. The classic air force–navy controversies 
are by no means old history. The conflicts are arising now and then within all 
maritime nations. As these essays are extremes in the air force’s understanding 
of maritime air power, two explanatory chapters on Trenchard’s and Slessor’s 
obsessions at the time of their writings have been written and presented as 
preambles to their respective essays. 
The four essays by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Hugh Montague 
Trenchard, 1st Viscount Trenchard, are quite rare. Even though Trenchard was 
one of the greatest pioneers of air power, he wrote very little. He himself stated 
in an interview in 1934: ‘I am not good at writing … I cannot set out my ideas 
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in nice order. But I believe the air is one.’1 As he was not a writer himself, he 
often used staff writers, ‘English merchants’, for formulating his thoughts on air 
power.2 Still, the texts which are in his name, as well as the Air Staff doctrines 
of the inter-war years, may well largely be understood as his thoughts. His 
position and influence over all aspects of British air power thinking in his time 
was substantial, and far beyond that of any of his successors. 
Trenchard’s first essay in this book, ‘The change over from Sea Power to Air 
Power’, is directly devoted to the air power–sea power controversy. The essay 
was written as an official secret document in December 1942. The essay is held 
by the National Archives in London, in file AIR 23/1360. The three following 
essays by Trenchard are broader treatments of air power, but also much focused 
on maritime air power and the conflict with the Royal Navy. These three essays 
are all held in the National Archives file AIR 20/5567. The essay ‘The Effect of 
the Rise of Air Power on War’ was first published as an official secret pamphlet 
in October 1943. ‘The Principles of Air Power in War’ was first published as 
an official secret pamphlet in May 1945, while the ‘Air Power and National 
Security’ essay was produced as a secret pamphlet in August 1946. With the 
publication of this last essay, the two former essays were also attached. All 
three essays were later also reproduced as ‘Air Ministry Pamphlet 229’ in 1963, 
then classified as Restricted. The essay ‘Air Power and National Security’ was 
declassified and reproduced in Eugene Emme’s The Impact of Air Power: National 
Security and World Politics in 1959, following a seminar on national security. 
Trenchard was the most influential Commander of the Royal Air Force. Even 
though he is not reckoned as an air power theorist, nor in fact a good aviator, he 
definitively should be regarded as one of the greatest air power thinkers. These 
essays, written by Trenchard, are thus important both as theoretical essays on 
air power as well as for understanding the classical air force–navy controversies 
over the administrative and operational command relationships. 
The other four essays on maritime air power reproduced here are written 
by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Cotesworth Slessor. In contrast 
to Trenchard, Slessor wrote extensively throughout his career. Slessor stands 
out as one of the greatest writers on British air power, as well as on maritime 
air power in general. His books Air Power and Armies of 1936 and The Central 
Blue of 1956 are monumental works. His books on nuclear strategy and NATO 
are also well recommended: Strategy for the West, The Great Deterrent, What 
1   AIR 8/167, Independent bombing force: report of an interview with Lord Trenchard 
(1934). 
2  P. Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Alabama: Air 
University Press, 1997), p. 53. 
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Price Coexistence? A Policy for the Western Alliance and These Remain. The essays 
reproduced in the present book are, however, of a different style. They are very 
much political, and very direct in their approach. Slessor, as many other air and 
sea power writers, was much occupied with military political life in the 1960s. 
These were times of economic decline for the defence sector, and following a 
great inter-service rivalry over the scarce resources available emerged. Slessor, 
even though a generally diplomatic, balanced and reflective thinker on maritime 
air power, became caught up in the British Air Ministry and Admiralty battle 
over the new carrier programmes of the 1960s. The four essays are very alike, 
and repeatedly using the same arguments. The ‘Capital Ship Complex’ essay is 
the most interesting for air and sea power study, and it covers most of the other 
essay’s arguments. I have still reproduced also the three later essays, as some 
differences and new arguments emerged. Slessor’s critiques of carrier aviation 
stands out as classical ‘air force extremes’. As such ‘air force extreme’ arguments 
still exist, and probably will so in the future, they provide good reading for both 
air force and naval students, officers and other readers. For instance, may the 
processes of the late 1990s towards a more integrated maritime air organisation 
well be examined in light of the history of the Services. 
Together, the eight articles by these two monumental personalities within 
the air power community represent some extreme understandings of maritime 
air power. In this respect, Trenchard and Slessor acted as ‘air power advocates’. 
They argued strongly for the supremacy of air power over sea power; meaning 
aircraft supremacy over traditional naval surface ships, land-based aviation’s 
supremacy over naval carrier aviation, and the need for a coherent and 
independent air force organisation. The purpose of this book is to reproduce 
and make available these extreme perceptions on maritime air power. There are 
two explanatory chapters setting the scene for the essays, but the texts are not 
analysed per se. 
I do not support the views put forward by either Trenchard or Slessor on 
maritime air power in these essays, but they speak for many – also contemporaries 
– and thus make important contributions to the debate. There is a time and 
place for naval carrier aviation, as there is a time for land based air power. 
Introduction
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Introduction to the essays  
by Trenchard 
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Hugh Montague Trenchard: 
a biographical note
Hugh Trenchard’s name is the most prominent in the history of the Royal Air 
Force. He is not known to be a theorist, but he must clearly be reckoned as one 
of the great thinkers and organisers of the early days of military aviation history. 
He has been labelled the ‘Father’, the ‘Creator’ and the ‘Architect’ of the Royal 
Air Force. In fact, he did not approve of any of these terms – but they are all 
descriptive of his position. His position was undisputed and very influential, but 
he was also controversial. Sir John Slessor described Trenchard as both a hero 
and prima donna: 
The Prima Donna – passionately involved, unpredictable, temperamental, often 
difficult to deal with, sometimes inclined to be egocentric, but supremely good at his 
job; the hero – a man whose physical and moral courage were unsurpassed; and in 
both, one of the few really great men of our time.4
Hugh Trenchard was born in Taunton on 3 February 1873. He joined the Royal 
Scots Fusiliers at a young age, and took part in operations around the world. As a 
39 year old Major, he became interested in the new trend of aviation and joined 
the newly formed Royal Flying Corps. He was older than most of the other 
aviators, but this also meant he was more experienced. He soon became Deputy 
to the first Commandant, Captain Godfrey Paine. As the Great War broke out, 
Trenchard held the command position of the Military Wing at Farnborough. 
He was then sent off to France to lead the No.1 Wing. By 1915 he had succeeded 
General Henderson as the General Officer Commanding the Royal Flying 
Corps, responsible for the Western Front air operations.5 When the Royal Air 
Force was created as the world’s first independent air force in 1918, he became 
the first Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). He was therefore central in the merging 
of the Royal Flying Corps of the Army and the Royal Naval Air Service into the 
 
4    J. Slessor, These Remain (London: Michael Joseph, 1969), p. 8. 
5   H. Probert, High Commanders of the Royal Air Force (London: HMSO, 1991), pp. 1–4. 
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world’s first unified air force. He did not hold this position for long, as he came 
into conflict with the Secretary of State for Air, Lord Rothermere. The question 
at stake was the political fate of Sir Douglas Haig6 and Sir William Robertson, 
both of whom were greatly respected by Trenchard. In addition, Trenchard saw 
Lord Rothermere’s political play as a source of great friction to the cause of 
a unified air service.7 Trenchard broke with Lord Rothermere and returned 
to France to command the air forces until the end of the war. After the war, 
Hugh Trenchard returned as Chief of the Air Staff. He was appointed the first 
Marshal of the Royal Air Force in 1927, and remained the official head of the 
Royal Air Force until his retirement in 1929. Upon retirement he entered the 
House of Lords as Baron Trenchard, and became Viscount Trenchard in 1936. 
Both during and after World War II, he was a public figure, speaking about air 
power and Royal Air Force issues. 
Hugh Trenchard, GCB, OM, GCVO, DSO, died on 10 February 1956. 
Today’s memory of this great pioneer is that of a builder of the first air force 
in the world, and an air power advocate of organisational independence. As for 
his perceptions on the use of air power, he is still most famous for his strong 
belief in ‘strategic bombing’ and ‘air control’, also called ‘imperial policing’. His 
thoughts on the issue of maritime air power are less known. The following four 
original articles by Hugh Trenchard will hopefully contribute to a better and 
broader understanding. 
6    The Cabinet and the High Command had been engaged in a running battle with Sir 
Douglas Haig over the course of events on the Western Front. Sir Douglas and Trench-
ard, who was his air advisor, resisted every request for the transfer of aircraft from the 
Western Front to the home front. Trenchard viewed defence as a misuse of aircraft, 
offence being their only proper role. (S. Robertson, ‘The Development of Royal Air 
Force Strategic Bombing Doctrine between the Wars. A Revolution in Military Affairs?’ 
in Aerospace Power Journal (Spring 1998)). 
7    A. Boyle, Trenchard: Man of Vision (London: Collins, 1962), pp. 250–251.
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The command of British maritime air forces
A background chapter on the process towards a unified air service in Britain, 
and the subsequent inter-service rivalry is necessary in order to understand 
Trenchard’s radical ‘air’ perspectives as presented in this book. From the early 
1920s he became fanatical about the unified air force. The air was one – and all 
aircraft should be under a unified leadership.  
 
Royal Air Force – the unified air service 
The history of military aviation in Britain started with the Balloon Section of the 
Royal Engineers, which later expanded to the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers. 
Following the introduction of the fixed-wing ‘heavier than air’ aircraft, the 
Royal Flying Corps (RFC) was constituted by Royal Warrant on 13 April 1912. 
This new organisation was intended to encompass all military aviation. Still, 
the thoughts of a specialised naval aviation group within the new establishment 
were all bedded from the beginning, with an offer of two aircraft and free flying 
lessons from a flying school at Eastchurch in Kent to the Royal Navy.8 The 
first four pilots were trained, and by late 1912 a separate Naval Wing of the 
Royal Flying Corps was established. However, the Admiralty was not satisfied 
with being under the control of the Army. On 1 July 1914, the Naval Wing was 
separated and formed the basis of the new Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS). All 
airships came under this new Command, and in September of same year the first 
naval air squadrons were formed. The Royal Naval Air Service soon grew to be 
larger in numbers than the Royal Flying Corps. The roles of the Royal Naval 
Air Service were focused on fleet reconnaissance and patrol of the coastlines 
in the hunt for submarines and ships, offensive operations in attacking enemy 
coastlines, and not at least the defense of the island from enemy air attacks. The 
RNAS even developed ways of operating aircraft from ships from this very first 
era of naval aviation. 
Many conflicts arose between the two more or less independent services 
during the First World War, and in 1916 it was decided to create an Air Board 
to deal with the limited logistical supplies. The visions for a new centralised 
and independent service also spread. The principles of ‘unity of war at sea’ and 
the ‘unity of war in the air’ became slogans. The ‘Smuts Committee Report’ of 
1917 (named after Lt General Jan Smuts, who led the enquiry group) and the 
Air Force Constitution Act of 1917 formed the basis of the world’s first unified 
8   M. Tagg, ‘Wings over Water’ in Maritime Patrol Aviation, September 1994.
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air force.9 However, the Act did not come into effect until the end of the war. 
The Air Ministry was formed on 2 January 1918, with Lord Rothermere as the 
first Secretary of State for Air. Major-General Hugh Trenchard became the 
first Chief of the Air Staff. The two existing air corps – the Royal Flying Corps 
and the Royal Naval Air Service were merged, and the Royal Air Force came into 
operation on 1 April 1918.  
The Royal Air Force officially held command of all military aviation in the 
period 1918–1937. During the early years of this period, the community of na-
val officers regarded the transfer to this new unified command as a relief, as they 
often had felt unappreciated by the Royal Navy. However, from the early 1920s, 
the Admiralty focused more on the potential of aviation and started fighting for 
their own control of the maritime air forces. The Royal Navy gradually gained 
more influence within the Royal Air Force led groups. Thus, it became readily 
apparent that integration of naval officers and crew was crucially important for 
effective operation of naval aviation. 
The Admiralty made numerous attempts at securing command over the 
maritime air forces. The discussions on command relationships became a con-
stant review issue and were treated by many political committees, the most 
important being the Belfour Sub-Committee of 1923 and the Trenchard-Keyes 
Agreement of 1924, which made important contribution to this integration.10 
Also many other attempts were made by both services.11 During these years of 
controversy, the groups of naval aviation became collectively labeled the ‘Fleet 
Air Arm’, though they still remained officially under Royal Air Force command. 
For practical reasons, operational control was still conducted by the ship com-
manders, and hence by the Royal Navy.12 
During the next decade, only minor adjustments were made. In 1925, the 
Admiralty approached the Colwyn Committee and made a new attempt at se-
curing command rights over the maritime air forces. The Admiralty’s proposal 
did not receive political support. The same story was repeated in 1928, when 
Lord Salisbury, who was acting as an arbitrator between the two Service De-
partments, effectively set aside the Admiralty’s demand for command rights. 
Later, some organisational adjustments resulted from Admiralty and Air Min-
9   AIR 2/2639, FLEET AIR ARM (Code B, 36): Fleet Air Arm: memorandum for Sir 
Thomas Inskip on organisation (1936). Memorandum from the first Sea Lord to Inskip, 
20 April 1936. 
10 AIR 2/2639, various correspondence and notes. 
11  See P. Meilinger, Airwar (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 77. 
12  See for instance D. Hobbs, ‘Naval Aviation, 1930-2000’, in Harding, Richard ed., The 
Royal Navy 1930-2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2005).
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istry agreements in 1932–1933. The Royal Navy gained an official line of own 
naval pilots and crew, as well as Squadron Leaders in the Royal Air Force led 
Fleet Air Arm organisation. 
Coastal Command and Fleet Air Arm 
The first great reorganisation of the Royal Air Force and consequent changes in 
maritime air power came in 1936 with the formation of the famous commands 
of Coastal Command, Fighter Command and Bomber Command. Subsequently, new 
debates arose questioning the unity of all military aviation. The result of these 
debates was a modification of the 1917–1918 agreements over unity at sea and 
in the air for warfare. Shortly after the establishment of Coastal Command, the 
Royal Navy regained command of its own air force. The Naval Air Branch of 
the Royal Navy was formed following a Government announcement on 30 July 
1937. Shortly thereafter officially renamed the Fleet Air Arm (FAA), which pre-
viously had been its ‘unofficial’ name. As for the land-based maritime air forces 
of the Coastal Command, these were to be kept under command of the Royal 
Air Force. The main rationale behind this decision was that large aircraft were 
inherently flexible and capable of performing several roles, and thus most effec-
tively commanded by a unified air force. This agreement, which created the still 
effective two-split British maritime air force structure, became known as the 
‘Inskip Award’ of 1937. It was named after Thomas W.H. Inskip, the Minister 
for Coordination of Defence. Inskips’s separation of the Fleet Air Arm from its 
‘parent unit’ was a hard blow to the Air Ministry and to Trenchard personally. 
As the soon-to-be Chief of the Air Staff, Newill,13 wrote to Trenchard just after 
the decision: ‘May I say at once that I know what you must feel after all you have 
done for the Air’.14 Trenchard’s famous perception was that the ‘air was one’ 
– and that it was ‘indivisible’.15 
When World War II broke out, the question of transfer of Coastal Com-
mand to the Royal Navy was raised once again. The Air Ministry was still against 
this, though the issue did not materialise into inter-service rivalry. Despite First 
Sea Lord Dudley Pound wanting unified maritime air force – under naval com-
13 Cyril L.N. Newall, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff between 1926 and 1931. Air Officer 
Commanding Middle East 1931–1935. Appointed Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) in 1937. 
14 AIR 8/223, Fleet Air Arm: Sir Thomas Inskip’s reports and papers (1937). Newill to 
Trenchard, 13 August 1937. 
15 M. Smith, British Air Strategy between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) p. 
185.
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mand – he did not find a war to be the right time for such changes.16 Following 
a Churchill inquiry and the Defence Committee (Operations) agreement of 
4 December 1940 on the question of command and control of the maritime 
air forces, the two Service Departments were simultaneously directed to find 
an agreement. A joint ‘Committee on Coastal Command’ was created, with 
Vice-Admiral Phillips (VCNS) and Air Vice-Marshal Harris (DCAS) as cen-
tral figures. This joint committee delivered a report on the challenging com-
mand issue on 19 March 1941.17 It was agreed that the Royal Navy should gain 
formal ‘operational control’ of the Coastal Command. This was supported by 
the Air Officer Commander-in-Chief Coastal Command, John Slessor. It was 
agreed that the Coastal Command would still be an integral part of the Royal 
Air Force.18 The institutional debating points were laid aside, and the opera-
tional co-operation was well handled by the new Admiralty/Coastal Command 
Committee for the remainder of the war.
Trenchard, who had no command posts during World War II, was still 
influential – and he would not leave the classical debate fully. The issue of the 
command relationship had been, and still was, a central question for him. This 
is a readily apparent underlying issue in Trenchard’s writing on maritime air 
power presented later in this book. 
The tension of inter-service rivalry did not disappear with World War 
II, even though effective operational command and control structures came 
into force. With the end of the war in sight, the debate quickly came to the 
surface again. Letters and notes were passed around in the autumn of 1944 
over the question of ‘Maritime Air Operations after the war’.19 By the summer 
of 1945, both the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy had produced their own 
studies relating to organisation and command arrangements over the maritime 
air forces. The Admiralty was again eager to gain full command rights over the 
maritime air forces, which the Air Ministry opposed. The Air Ministry’s initial 
preference was for a continued two-split organisation of the maritime air forces 
– with effective joint and flexible solutions of operational control of the forces 
determined by the specific demands that any future conflict would require. The 
16 J. Buckley, Maritime Air Power and the Second World War, in S. Cox and P. Gray eds., 
Air Power History (London: Frank Cass, 2002).
17 AIR 20/933, Coastal Command: operational control (1945–1947), including a copy of 
the 1941 report from the ‘Committee on Coastal Command’ 19 March 1941. 
18 AIR 20/933, Air Ministry note by Merkham, 4 October 1945.
19 E.g. AIR 2/9655, ROYAL AIR FORCE: Coastal Command (Code B, 67/10): Maritime 
Air Forces: organisation (1945–1946); AIR 20/933, Coastal Command: operational 
control (1945–1947). 
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Air Ministry was satisfied with the solution of 1941 but recommended an altered 
Admiralty–Air Ministry Committee to replace the effective Admiralty–Coastal 
Command Committee of 1941. The basic argument was still the inherent 
flexibility of air forces, and that any air power effort and allocation of forces 
always had to come from a consideration of the ‘air situation as a whole’.20 
From the autumn of 1945 to early 1946 the debate continued in a 
diplomatically correct and polite manner. The question was first raised 
officially at a separate meeting between Vice Admiral McGrigor (VCNS) and 
Air Marshal Durston (DCAS), Rear Admiral Lambe (ACNS (Air) and Air Vice 
Marshal Dickson on 25 January 1946.21 Following this meeting, Air Marshal 
Durston wrote to Vice Admiral McGrigor communicating the Air Ministry’s 
understanding of the meeting, namely that the basic organisation of 1941 and 
the allocation of forces to meet commitments in the various theatres would 
be carried out by the Chiefs of Staff.22 This was not the understanding held 
by the Admiralty, and the debate soon escalated. Vice Admiral McGrigor 
revised the document, and made it clear that there could only be ‘one authority 
[the Admiralty] responsible to HM Government for the control of sea 
communication’.23 With this, the debate had turned into a new inter-service 
rivalry over the command of the maritime air forces. As one Air Ministry official 
wrote: ‘The nigger is now right out of the wood-pile’.24 
A ridiculous, but perhaps necessary inter-service rivalry continued 
throughout 1946 until an agreement was reached by the end of the year. It was 
decided that command of the maritime air forces would be upheld in accordance 
with the conclusions reached by the Defence Committee (Operations) of the 
War Cabinet in December 1940. This new agreement of 1946 is known as the 
‘Dickson-Lambe Agreement’. To a large extent, it was the Air Ministry who 
won their case. They had argued for the solution of 1940–1941 throughout the 
1945–1946 controversy. The agreement of 1946 over the command relationships 
concerning the maritime forces recognised that naval command would normally 
be the predominant actor in terms of operations, but Coastal Command would 
continue to remain an integral part of the Royal Air Force.  
20 See AIR 20/933, C.A.S. to V.C.A.S. 9 October 1945; and notes by A.C.A.S. (Ops) 12 
October 1945.  
21 AIR 20/933, Note of meeting, 25 January 1946. 
22 AIR 20/933, Air Marshal Durston (D.C.A.S.) to Vice Admiral McGrigor (V.C.N.S.), 4 
March 1946. 
23 AIR 20/933, Vice Admiral McGrigor (V.C.N.S.) to Air Marshal Durston (D.C.A.S.), 23 
March 1946.
24 AIR 20/933, J.C.S./A.M.P. to D.C.N.S., 26 March 1946. 
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When reading Trenchard’s essays in the following chapter, the long political 
battle between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy over organisational 
structures, which lasted from the early 1920s until the end of World War II, 
should be kept in mind. If one looks beyond the most radical statements of this 
inter-service rivalry and Trenchard’s obsession with the ‘unified air force’, the 
essays makes a valuable contribution to any air power reading list. 
Introduction to the essays by Trenchard
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‘The change over from Sea Power to Air Power’
Great Britain and the British Empire as they exist to-day have been built 
up on trade carried in ships. This fact has been recognised from the earliest 
time and the first attempt to maintain our trade in the face of opposition was 
the armed merchant ship.
In the course of time it was found that it was uneconomical and 
inefficient to attempt to combine the qualities of a merchant ship with those 
of a ship of war, and from this realisation the professional Navy emerged.
This Navy, whose sole function was to maintain the security of this 
country by assuring a measure of control of the sea communications, was 
and is dependent on other forms of strength for its continued existence. The 
manufacturing power of the country and its manpower provide the equipment 
and personnel and the Army has, in the past, assured the security of its bases.
It is true to say, therefore, that the British Empire has been built up in 
the last two hundred years on Sea Power, and been maintained by Sea Power.
By ‘Sea Power’ I mean the keeping open of the seas and oceans for our 
merchant ships by surface warships of all sizes, from battleships down to the 
smallest craft, and denying the use of the seas to the enemy.
But the Wright brothers changed all that when they left the ground at 
Kittyhawk. Air Power was then conceived. The deep significance of that flight 
lies in the fact that warfare is no longer in two dimensions but in three.
Since then our progress has been remarkable. From small beginnings 
and technical limitations that are fast disappearing, we reached the Great War 
when, among countless other duties, aircraft played an important part. Then 
followed the post war period, when long-distance flights over the oceans and 
continents of the world showed that aircraft could circum-navigate the globe 
with but a few stops.
Fighting aircraft, bombers, fighters and torpedo-bombers, developed 
rapidly with their own weapons, until the aeroplanes which Wilbur Wright 
flew became a formidable vehicle for war.
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Organisation and yet further development rapidly built up what is now 
widely recognised as the most potent influence in the world to-day – Air Power.
Before and after Munich we saw what the mere threat of Air action could 
achieve in land-locked countries. We have since seen, notably off Singapore, at 
Midway, and off the Solomons, what Air Power can do to those who go down 
to the sea in ships.
The prophecies of those who years ago pointed to the decisive influence 
which the Air would be able to exert over land and sea have been proved to the 
hilt.
The present rate of progress is so rapid as to leave no room whatever for 
doubt but that Air Power is going to have an over-all influence over land and 
sea alike. In the “thousand-bomber” raids we know something of the shape of 
things to come as far as the land is concerned. And we have seen an Air/Land 
Power challenge an Air/Sea Power, in a manner which is pressing us closely.
The Air is handicapped at present because many of us lived in the past 
when there was no Air. We are strongly influenced by our surroundings and by 
the thought of the period in our early life, such as between the ages of fifteen 
and thirty. Those are the thoughts we remember. In the stress of difficult times 
we revert to type, to what we believed and thought in those days when there 
was no Air. There is no doubt about it. We are inclined to be dangerously 
prone to this influence of our ideas and conception of warfare in our early 
years. Those who have been born since the Wright brothers first flew are 
naturally imbued with the spirit of the Air. Most of the principles and methods 
used by those who lived in the days when we had not mastered the Air are out-
of-date. Instead they will be replaced by the ideas of the new generation which 
is arising, the generation that is fighting this war for the New World.
At the end of this war the Air will be, and that without question, the 
predominating influence in the whole world, although it is likely that the 
Army may be of more importance to the British Empire than in the past. Our 
Army will need to be larger and better equipped, because the enemy will dig 
underground and put his bases and supplies there (on the lines of the great 
caves outside Heliopolis or the underground works in this country). The Army 
will be required to dig the opposing enemies out of these underground places 
and move them out of prepared positions. In mobile warfare the Army will 
secure our air bases from land assault.
 
Innmat ny mal.indd   24 06-12-07   15:51:59
25
Let us now examine Sea Power for a moment.
To-day no fleet, however powerful, can operate effectively within reach 
of an undefeated and strong air force. It requires an air umbrella before it can 
work effectively in open water. Coastal waters are almost closed to it, even 
when supported by a large carrier-borne air force. All ships, from battleships 
to cruisers, destroyers to submarines, are seriously hampered by the effective 
use of Air Power, unless their own air forces control the waters in which they 
operate.
Air forces, supported by light craft, daily pass our trade safely from point 
to point along the North Sea and Channel, in the face of a strong air threat. 
Only when trade adventures away from the protection of the Air do the 
enemy air forces, and the enemy surface and subsurface vessels take their toll. 
In other words, Air Power as a controlling force has already supplemented Sea 
Power in the exercise of Sea Power, and for obvious reasons.
It seems that the time has come for us seriously to reconsider the whole 
situation as it affects our sea-borne trade. 
The Navy would have us continue to build fleets for the same purpose 
for which they were effective thirty years ago and for which to-day I believe 
them to be ineffective.
As I have already said, big warships operating in narrow seas or near 
coasts must have air cover protecting them, which is a mis-use of the home 
aircraft which could be used much more effectively to destroy the enemy’s 
warships (if they have any) or anyhow to protect our own merchant shipping 
and attack the enemy’s merchant shipping.
The fewer warships the Air have to protect the better. The prestige of 
losing a warship is much greater than losing a merchant ship. Therefore, 
convoys that are escorted by warships have to have added protection to 
cover the warships as well as the merchant ships, which the Air could cover 
effectively alone.
The next point I turn to is aircraft carriers, at present of some use. It may 
be that aircraft carriers will be necessary until the end of the war, where air 
bases have not been established and no facilities are available for shore-based 
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aircraft. But no naval battle in the last two hundred and fifty years had been 
fought more than a hundred miles from shore, and only one that distance 
– Tushima. To say that aircraft carriers are necessary for the oceans in which 
sea battles are fought is not supported by reality. 
There is a naval saying which explains the reason for this historical fact. 
It is as follows:
   “Enemy forces can be intercepted and brought to battle at the point  
 of departure or in transit or at the point of arrival. Of these three 
 methods, that of interception in transit is by far the most difficult.”
It is obvious that if one knows the base from which the enemy fleet 
is operating, the area for search for his ships is restricted. Similarly if the 
objective of his attack is known, he can easily be found. But anywhere in the 
open spaces of the oceans the enemy fleet may take its course with the object 
of evading interception, when the area of search is immeasurably greater.
Next, the submarine problem. Before the war we were generally told that 
the submarine was no longer a menace, but after three years of this war I think 
all recognise that it is still as a great a menace – if not greater than – it was in 
the last war.
It has been tackled as a naval problem and the Air made subordinate, and 
I feel the whole problem is an Air problem, and that the ships should aid the 
Air in helping to suppress this menace.
Is it not true to say in the last war and in this submarine arena25 regard 
aircraft and also that hidden and mysterious weapon, the mine, as a most 
serious menace?
Announcements have been made in the Press recently of battles between 
U-boats and aircraft over the ‘body’ of a merchant convoy. Until the arrival of 
aircraft the enemy U-boat had taken heavy toll of the shipping in spite of the 
most gallant and determined efforts on the part of surface escorts. But with 
the intervention of Air Power, the enemy attack has been broken up and the 
convoy saved.
25 The word is of very poor print-quality in the original copy. It has been estimated to 
read [arena]. 
 
Innmat ny mal.indd   26 06-12-07   15:51:59
2
It is not difficult to see why the submarines fear aircraft more greatly 
than they fear surface craft. In the case of the surface ship, it is usually the 
submarines which brings off surprise, and owing to its ability to dive and 
its high speed on the surface, the submarine has a very good chance of 
evading the counter-attack. When faced with aircraft, however, the speed and 
manoeuvrability which enabled the submarine to avoid the surface vessel is 
entirely inadequate. The aircraft can frequently achieve surprise by the use 
of cloud cover, and by flying down the rays of the sun. Its rate of approach to 
its target enables it to deliver its attack frequently before the submarine has 
time to dive. This makes the bombing attack very much more accurate than is 
the surface vessel’s depth charge where nothing can be seen of the submerged 
submarine and only a rough estimate made of its position below the surface.
Our own submarine Commanders have paid testimony to the efficacy of 
air attack. Certain areas of the oceans in which they have wished to operate 
have, in spite of the greatest courage and determination on their part, been 
almost denied to them by the activities of the enemy Air.
Mines are laid by air (or the majority of them are) and aircraft cover vast 
areas of water where surface ships cover few.  And most important of all, Air 
can destroy and damage the sources of submarine production in Germany. It 
seems to me, therefore, it is primarily an Air problem.
To conclude, if England and America use Air Power as it should be used, 
it will win the war more quickly, it will dominate the world in future, and it 
will keep the peace.
The most offensive weapon yet invented in the world must not be used 
for the purpose of enabling the old and out-of-date methods of warfare to 
work. Nor must the swiftest and most powerful vehicle lack support when 
peace comes. 
If we are old-fashioned and are left behind in the race we shall break 
faith with the young people who are fighting our battles so valiantly for us; 
young people to whom we have promised a New World with new ideas.
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‘The Effect of the Rise of Air Power on War’
FOREWORD
This note, which I am circulating to a few people, may be found 
somewhat controversial. As we move ever more rapidly towards final victory, 
when our Officers and men of all three Services have done and are doing so 
magnificently, and many of them are giving their all, some people may say 
“why not let well alone?” Yet I suggest that is a highly dangerous policy. We 
read how the great battles are being waged, we see headlines of the great 
casualties we may expect to suffer in some future operations.
Releasing that the war is not yet won I feel it is highly desirable, in the 
exuberance of our recent success, to reflect calmly before we launch other 
operations that might bring about terrible losses, when the same victories can 
be more swiftly won at a lower cost by using the right weapons at the right 
time.
Correct thinking about air power is vital to the world and in particular to 
the British Empire both for this war and the future.
Britain formed a separate Air Force from her practical experience in 
the Great War on a policy which has been proved correct in this one. Air has 
already shown more power than any theorist of twenty or thirty years ago 
thought possible.
Many books have been written during this war, chiefly by American 
authors, on the rise of Air Power – the most notable being Seversky’s “Victory 
Through Air Power,” Huie’s “Fight for Air Power,” and Ziff’s “Coming Battle 
of Germany.” Because a great number of other books and articles continue to 
be published and many speeches made by those who still mis-read the lessons 
of this war, I feel the time has perhaps come when a short note may usefully 
be written by an English man.
For this reason I have ventured to express in the following pages a few 
of my views derived from first-hand experience and 31 years study of the Air 
(including the lessons of this war and the last war, and the many minor wars in 
the intervening period) for the purpose of helping forward discussion on this 
most important subject.
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I have tried to put down in simple language what is the belief of 
practically everyone in the Royal Air Force and what a great part of the Army 
believe and some of the Navy.
I am confident that the majority of the population of England will 
broadly agree with a great deal of what I have tried to imply, although 
Whitehall and Washington may not yet do so; for, as I have often said, 
probably 80 per cent. of the people of Britain and America believe in the 
claims of air power made by airmen, while 80 per cent. of Whitehall and 
Washington do not. 
The purpose of writing this pamphlet is to set out the lessons and facts 
that we should learn from this war to date so that they may be taken into 
account in bringing to a successful conclusion the Hitler war and in our plans 
for the war against Japan.
In this short paper I have not attempted to cover the whole ground as 
that would be impossible without making it unduly long.
TRENCHARD.
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MARSHAL FOCH said That no War is like the previous War.
Many thinkers support this view. On the other hand a large number of 
military and naval theorists are continually stating that the principles of war 
never change while they proceed to lay down methods as though they were 
principles.
Methods Though Change.
There is no such thing as academic war. Every war is different, although 
certain characteristics are common to most.
Since the world started wars have been fought on land and sea. The 
Army moves forward or backward, right or left, until stopped by seas, rivers 
or mountains. With every yard it advances or retreats the army’s problems 
alter. Methods of solving those changing problems must be varied to suit the 
geographical features of the ground.
The Sea and the Air encounter fewer obstacles than the Army. The Navy 
moves forward and backward, right or left, until stopped by land or rocks.   
The Air has no barrier save weather, and even that is being swiftly 
overcome. It can move forward, backward, left, right, up or down, in an 
immense three-dimensional space which appears so vast that few people 
understand it. And weather affects all three Services in more or less equal 
proportions; the Army by floods, mud and cold; the Navy through gales, fogs, 
and heavy seas; and the Air by fog and icing-up.
Fighting in three dimensions is unique. It had never happened before the 
Great War and then only few realised the development it foreshadowed, and 
such a startling innovation can never happen again. 
We must realise certain facts about fighting in three-dimensional space before 
we can discuss the future of war. Here are the two most important:
1. THE AIR IS INDIVISIBLE. IT ADMITS NO BARRIERS. Unlike  
 the oceans, seas, waterways, or the land, THE AIR IS ONE.
2. The law of gravity affects aircraft more seriously than ships or land  
 vehicles. The great weight of fuel carried by aircraft relative to their  
 total weight affects their performance.
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“THIS IS TOTAL WAR” – So runs a phrase of the day. 
     But when stripped of its propaganda value this phrase simply means 
that this war has again proved, what all wars had previously shown, the 
necessity of co-operation and the necessity of harnessing all the resources of 
the Nation when the very existence of the Nation is at stake.
I fully agree with the importance of co-operation, especially between 
the Services, and this has always been ungrudgingly given in the battle zone. 
Nevertheless, it is too often erroneously thought that co-operation implies the 
combined use of all types of weapons, and methods, in war, whereas the truth 
is that with all the will in the world and the best possible co-operation, some 
types of equipment can prove a definite handicap. For instance, when the 
bomb works and factories in Paris the co-operation of Destroyers up the river 
Seine would be a definite liability because of the air cover they would require.
There are many operations in war in which one Service or one Arm 
cannot co-operate with another Service or another Arm. In fact this can 
sometimes prove a handicap as it often was on the Frontier of India. Whenever 
an operation took place there it was considered necessary to do two things; 
first to bomb the rebellious tribes after warning them they were going to be 
bombed, and then to advance with a brigade or a Division of Infantry of the 
Army. But because the enemy there loved a fight, directly the Army advanced 
he was overjoyed; for that gave him an opportunity to capture rifles and 
ammunition and carry on: even when some of the tribesmen were killed, they 
felt it was worth while, for they killed some of us and captured a good deal of 
loot. The tribesmen did not think the fight worth while if loot was not to be 
got, and if their villages were destroyed, thus forcing them to live in caves and 
interrupting the whole life of the tribe. After living in the caves for some time, 
fleas drove them out and they were ready to make peace. In one typical case 
when the recalcitrant tribesmen were on the point of giving in after two months 
of bombing, the Army decided to advance. Thereupon the enemy started to 
fight again and the whole affray started once more. This was proved after the 
subsequent collapse of resistance, which is precisely what I mean when I say 
that sometimes the Air can be hindered by the co-operation of another Arm.
Co-operation is thus not always desirable when it means using the wrong 
weapon. Although it may be useful and have to be carried out in certain 
circumstances, we should be quite certain that the weapons used are the most 
effective and economical, particularly in lives.
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In these days neither the Army nor the Navy can fight without appalling 
casualties unless the Air has first won its battle for the Mastery of the Air.
In the land battles of yesterday losses were very severe. Take those of the 
Great War; on the Somme we lost over 480,000 men and it lasted for two or 
three months; Passchendaele cost us some 500,000 men and Neuve Chapelle 
over 200,000. Then what explains our sequence of victories from El Alamein 
and Tunisia at a cost of only 20,000 to 40,000 men? There was every reason to 
expect even greater casualties than in the last war. All the destroying weapons 
man’s ingenuity has devised were available in huge numbers on either side 
– mines, mortars, quick-firing guns, artillery and tanks – yet the casualties 
were small. What new factor had helped to win these victories so quickly and 
economically? AIR POWER.
Again, on the sea, after our Navy won its victories at Taranto and 
Matapan which should have ensured our mastery of the Mediterranean, why 
was the Crete disaster, and the closing of the Mediterranean the sequel? 
Because our Air Power was then negligible compared to the enemies’ and 
based out of reach.
A convoy to Malta was for eighteen months a most expensive necessity and 
in the closing stages of the siege a near impossibility. The few ships which got in 
during the summer of 1942 to keep the starving island going were a proportion 
of those which set out. What a price to pay when this island might never had 
been in danger had the importance of Air Power been recognised early enough.
Why simultaneously with the Army’s advance in Africa from East and 
West did we regain the lost mastery of the Mediterranean? Was it not because 
our local command of the Air enabled the Army to capture more air bases 
which put our Air Force within reach of our convoys on passage again? And 
was it not because of the disintegration caused by our Air attack that all 
control of the German army was lost and our Army was able to push them out 
of Africa with relatively small losses?
In this connection I would refer to a recent visit I made to North Africa 
immediately after the collapse of the German Army in May, 1943. I met a 
large number of people, both American and British, who were in command of 
the Army and Air Force in North Africa, from the highest to the most junior. 
But I met only a comparatively few Naval officers.
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I visited battlefields on the ground, and flew over them at low and 
medium height. I also saw the material effect from the ground and the Air of 
ours, and the German aerial bombardment, and examined many photographs 
and talked to many people. 
Lessons which impressed themselves on my mind.
What was the reason for the sudden quick collapse of the German Army 
in North Africa? It was a dramatic collapse, and yet by all accounts the morale 
of the front line troops was not really broken, nor was the Army in a state of 
physical exhaustion. In fact, they were not half as hard hit physically for want 
of food as we were in Malta.
Going over the battlefields and talking to some of the officers who took 
part in some of the battles, brought back to my mind very much what land 
fighting is, and impressed upon me how much more deadly it has become with 
the improved fire-power of the modern weapons of a land army combined 
with nature’s barriers.
All land warfare down through the ages has been a most difficult and 
complicated affair owing to nature’s vagaries; the snow capped mountains, 
swamps, ridges, little furrows, holes in the ground, little and big wadis, 
undulations that can conceal companies, battalions, brigades, or even divisions; 
woods, hedges, ditches and dykes.
Land fighting has always been the most confused, even to the men 
fighting in the front line. Muddles develop. Sometimes a series of little 
muddles, sometimes greater muddles, caused by the noise, heat, dust, darkness, 
mines, gun-fire, the interruption of messengers being killed, the appalling 
deafening effect of all the types of fire on the brain over which voices cannot 
even be heard. This means you must have a wonderfully trained Army in the 
front-line, and even then the battle becomes a series of muddles, company 
muddles, battalion muddles, brigade muddles and sometimes even as big as 
Divisional muddles. It is the task of the Commander to keep control of these 
muddles and avoid them developing into chaos. The great Commanders 
behind the Brigades, the Divisions, Corps and Armies keep control from the 
information coming in by withdrawing here, reinforcing there, re-organising 
somewhere else, giving artillery support in another place to give the time for 
re-organisation and so on. The great Commander is he who stops all these 
muddles turning into chaos, or affecting his chief plan.
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That to me is war on the land, and it is a thousand times worse to-day 
owing to the increased power of modern army weapons, mines, and Air Power.
When one side has gained Air supremacy, it can then hit at the opposing 
army with all its weight. When this happens Air Forces destroy all control and 
the great Army machine disintegrates. There is no control left. Nobody knows 
where they are, what they are doing, where the enemy is or where anything 
is. Nobody knows where to bring up ammunition or supplies, or whether any 
wireless stations are working, or where they should set up any wireless centres, 
if there are any left to set up. All control ceases and with it the complete 
disintegration (I can think of no better word) of the enemies’ army. This does 
not mean though that our Army will not have to fight to drive the enemy out 
of their positions and complete the victory.
In this short paper I will not attempt to define the task of those directing 
the Air Power on to the vulnerable points of the opposing army except to 
say that this confusion and demoralisation can be brought about with almost 
negligible material damage being done.
That is what it seemed to me happened in Poland, Holland, Belgium, 
France, and to our enemies in North Africa. The casualties were small, 
material effect was small, but control was lost.
This war has shown that the power of the air over navies is much greater 
than the power of the air over armies.
Look at the sinking of the “Repulse” and “Prince of Wales,” and many 
others. Some were knocked out by high-level bombing and some by torpedo 
attack. Look at the Mediterranean and the knocking out of the “Illustrious” 
and the sinking of the “Ark Royal” and other ships. Look at the sinking of the 
“Roma” by bombing, even after the Germans had lost supremacy in the Air in 
Southern Europe. Look at the lessons we have learned at Pearl Harbour. Look 
at the ships that where knocked out and the months and even years that it has 
taken to repair them.
When a ship is knocked out it is really serious because it either sinks to the 
bottom of the sea or sinks in the mud in the harbours and has to be raised. It 
takes a long time to repair it. The loss of life is great. The loss of material takes 
a long time to replace. It is generally much more of a complete loss than any 
damage than can be inflicted on Armies, such as the knocking out of a battery.
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There is no doubt that aircraft carriers have sometimes been found almost 
a liability although in many places they have been of considerable value, such 
as in the middle of the Atlantic, and in protecting convoys to Malta. Where 
carriers have been successfully used is where there has been no equal Air Power 
against them.
On the other hand in my opinion one lesson of this war is that aircraft-
carriers cannot operate within range of shore-based enemy aircraft, without 
undue loss, where we have not first obtained complete mastery over the enemy’s 
air power with our shore-based aircraft. They are such highly vulnerable vessels 
that it is not too much to say that all the aircraft carried (about 50 to 60) are 
nominally fully occupied protecting the carrier and its escort, and there are few 
to spare to attack the enemy elsewhere – unless our shore-based aircraft have 
obtained a high degree of local air mastery anyway.
There are two further points which must be borne in mind in connection 
with Air Power:
First, THIS WAR HAS PROVED THAT IT TAKES MORE 
AIRCRAFT TO PROTECT A SHIP AT SEA OR IN HARBOUR IF IT IS 
WITHIN MODERATE RANGE OF THE ENEMY’S SHORE-BASED 
AIRCRAFT THAN IT DOES TO ATTACK A SHIP.
It probably takes five or six times as many aircraft to protect a ship than to 
attack one due to the fact that with such a fast-moving weapon as Air (aircraft 
travel at over 300 miles per hour and a ship does not do more than 30 knots) 
the initiative goes to the attacker, and the defender always has to have either 
aircraft up in the air to protect the ship or crews standing by to take off at a 
second’s notice for twenty-four hours a day.
Second, THE AIR CAN CARRY MUCH MORE DESTRUCTION TO 
THE ENEMY PER MAN WITH A MINIMUM LOSS OF LIFE, THAN 
ANY OTHER FORM OF WARFARE.
As Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher said in 1919:
“As the locusts swarmed over Egypt, so will the aircraft swarm in the 
heavens, carrying (some of them) inconceivable cargoes of men and bombs, 
some fast, some slow. Some will act like battle cruisers, others as destroyers. 
All cheap and (this is the gist of it) only requiring a few men as the crew.”
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And that is true. I should not be surprised to learn that more explosive 
power has been used by the Air on one night’s bombing of Cologne or 
Hamburg than has been used in this war by all the Allied ships of all the Allied 
navies, except for anti-aircraft fire.
 How much weight of explosive do the big battleships of 35,000 tons 
carry for their 14 or 16 inch guns? We know that in the last war a 250 lb. 
bomb contained more explosive than a 16 inch shell, because the weight of the 
casing of the explosive in order to withstand the shock of the discharge of the 
gun is so much greater than the weight of the casing enclosing a bomb.
 Would not less than a dozen of our big bombers drop more weight 
of explosive in one minute at a 500 miles range than can be fired from all 
the big guns on a battleship using up all their ammunition? Generally our 
big bombers carry a crew of only seven to ten men. What is the crew of a 
big battleship? Some 1,500 or more. It must also be remembered that the 
explosive used in firing a gun is not what harms the foe. It certainly makes 
a noise and therefore frightens the enemy and heartens our own troops, but 
seldom causes real damage to the enemy.
 There is another point to be remembered, the life of a gun is short. It 
cannot fire as much explosive on the enemy in its normal life, without being 
re-lined, as may be dropped by one of our bombers in its normal life without 
being rebuilt.
 It has been said that at Salerno battleships have been of assistance to our 
troops ashore.
 No doubt this is true because of the moral effect of the great ships going 
close in shore and firing their guns at close range.Was it the damage they did 
though which helped our troops, or was it the demoralizing effect the guns 
had on the enemy?
 I am the last to decry the use of any weapon which can demoralise 
the enemy, but was the actual damage as great as could have been caused by 
bombers, and was the moral effect as great?
 Incidentally, the battleships at Salerno could only be used there because 
the Air had first obtained complete superiority.
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 Many times it is asked “CAN WE WIN THE WAR BY BOMBING 
ALONE?” I do not know. I have never claimed that we can. Equally I have 
never suggested that we cannot. The answer to this question brings us to the 
great divergence between the old types of warfare and the new. Nevertheless, 
this war has admittedly shown the tremendous power of the bomber, it has 
surely shown what it can do in Germany. 
It has destroyed many vitally important production factories, and 
damaged many others; it has destroyed great industrial towns, and is slowly 
but surely destroying the normal life of their people. This could not have been 
done by any other weapons. If Bomber Command were double its size what 
would it not have achieved?
Surely the writing is plain for all to read, after Hamburg, Hanover, 
Munich, Rostock, and many other places.
And what about the high-level precision bombing of the American Air 
Force? In the early days many doubted whether daylight bombing could 
ever be kept up, or whether it could be carried any distance into Germany. 
Fortunately, the American Air Force Commands never doubted it, nor did a 
certain number of people in this country.
What have been the positive results?
They have destroyed hundreds of vital factories. They have penetrated 
far into Germany. They have fought great battles, day after day, all the way to 
their targets, over their targets, and back from their targets, destroying many 
more enemy aircraft than they have lost themselves. No one who has seen 
the air photographs can doubt that this day-light bombing is having a most 
devastating effect on vital workshops. Were this Force double what would it 
not do?
It must be remembered the day-light bombing is supplementary to the 
night bombing, but the two together much exceed the sum of the two.
Again, what about the Pacific? It is plain for all to see what the Japanese 
did to the Americans and ourselves at Pearl Harbour and Singapore, and now 
what the American and Australian Air Forces are doing to them – to their 
shipping, to their navies and their aircraft.
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The world recognises the indomitable courage, determination and 
endurance of the American and Royal Air Force bomber crews, who fight 
these great bombing battles daily and nightly miles up in the Air under 
incredible conditions, giving their all to achieve their and our object. Though 
the cost of life and limb of the bomber crews may on occasion be heavy, 
the world has never known such a small rate of loss in comparison to the 
population of the nation, taking into consideration the magnitude of these 
great bombing battles and the effect they are having in shortening the war. 
Surely it is accepted by all that every effort must be made to win a war 
with as moderate casualties as possible. If we wipe out a whole generation even 
though we may have won the battle, untold harm has been done to the Nation 
by the loss of life.
Casualties in this war, where the Air have won Air Supremacy first, have 
been very light compared with previous wars.
The casualties of the armies in Holland, Belgium and France were very 
small both to the defenders and attackers. The complete disintegration of the 
Allied Army in these battles, and the complete disintegration of the German 
Forces at El Alamein, Tunisia, Sicily and Italy was due to Air.
Fire power and modern weapons on the ground and the enormous 
number of mines that are now used, are so powerful that if any Army attacks 
before the Air has gained supremacy, it wipes out a whole generation of young 
men; whereas if the Air battle is won first the Air can then turn all its weight 
on the enemy’s Army, communications and control, and save thousands of 
lives in our Army, provided the Army is ready to hit and fight with the utmost 
vigour to take the enemies’ battlefields or country immediately.
I fully recognise that although we have to face the war as it is and 
not as we should have wished it to be, Armies are already committed in 
various places, and it is the duty of all to see that their casualties are kept 
to a minimum in the successful prosecution of the war. But that does 
not necessarily mean that we should get committed to further great land 
campaigns and then be forced to use the Air in the manner of the Russians and 
Germans on the Eastern Front. This way of employing their Air Forces was 
forced on Russia by the attack of the whole German army in ’41. The object 
of this paper is to prevent our undertaking too soon campaigns based on 
history of bygone days because of pressure both political and military.
 
Innmat ny mal.indd   38 06-12-07   15:52:00
39
THERE IS NOT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT THAT IF WE 
LAUNCH AN OFFENSIVE IN FRANCE, AS OUR RUSSIAN ALLIES 
AND MANY OF OUR OWN PEOPLE WOULD WISH, BEFORE 
THE BOMBER FORCE HAS PARALYSED GERMAN PRODUCTION, 
ALTHOUGH VICTORY WOULD EVENTUALLY BE WON ITS PRICE 
IN HUMAN LIFE WOULD BE A HUNDRED TIMES AS GREAT 
BECAUSE WE WOULD NOT BE USING THE RIGHT AND THE 
MOST ECONOMICAL WEAPONS AT THE RIGHT TIME.
The significant sequence of events of this War.
1.  Is was the German Army and German Air Force that brought about the 
collapse of Poland, Holland, Belgium, France and Norway.
2.  It was the Air that won the battle of Britain.
3.  It was the Army and the Air that won the battle of El Alamein.
4.  It was the Army and the Air that brought about the collapse of the 
Germans in Tunisia.
5.  It was the Army and the Air that re-opened the Mediterranean for the 
Navy and Merchant Ships.
6.  It was the Air that won Pantellaria. 
7.  It was the Air that enabled our troops to land in Sicily with practically no 
casualties and it was the Army and the Air, helped by the transport of the 
Navy, that brought about the collapse of Sicily.
8.  It was the Air that brought about the surrender of Italy, with the threat of 
the Army ready to hit at once.
9.  It was the Air, supported by the Navy, that reduced the submarine 
menace in the Atlantic. Would it not be true to say that probably more 
than 60 per cent. of the submarines now being sunk or damaged are 
being sunk or damaged by Air? And it is not too much to say that in a 
comparatively short period this percentage may be even greater.
This has been achieved by:
a. Mining the waters where the Navy cannot reach.
b. Aircraft based on shore for reconnaissance purposes to help to locate
them for the surface naval craft to destroy.
c. Direct action against the submarines by shore-based aircraft and out in
 the middle of the oceans by carrier-based aircraft.
10. It was the Air by itself that also reduced the submarine menace in the
Atlantic and elsewhere by:
a. Bombing the production centres and assembly yards of submarines in
Germany and in German occupied countries.
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b. Bombing the ports from which the submarines emerge into the sea. 
Although bombing the submarine pens is of little use, the bombing of 
the port installations definitely interferes with the submarines free access
to the seas.
 WE WON THE BATTLE OF THE AIR BEFORE EL  
 ALAMEIN AND TUNISIA.
 WE WON THE BATTLE OF THE AIR BEFORE WE WENT  
 INTO SICILY.
 WE WON IT BEFORE WE WENT INTO ITALY.
 AND WE HAVE WON IT IN THE ATLANTIC AND  
 MEDITERRANEAN AND IN THE BAY OF BISCAY. 
FINALLY, THE AIR IS SLOWLY BUT SURELY DESTROYING THE 
PRODUCTION CENTRES OF GERMANY WHICH WILL IN TIME 
RENDER THEM POWERLESS TO SUPPLY THEIR ARMIES AND AIR 
FORCES IN THE FIELD AND TO CARRY ON THE WAR.
In conclusion, the Air is saving and will save untold casualties in the 
other Services, provided the Army and Navy are in a position to support it 
when the time comes to advance and take immediate advantage of the enemy’s 
impotence rather than seek to operate as the spear-head of war in the future.
When this war comes to an end I feel certain we should plan the future 
defence of this Empire on the following facts:
1. The Air will dictate strategy and therefore dominate all wars because of its 
over-all influence.
2. The Army will be more important to the British Empire than ever before 
because armies will be able to dig underground and make prepared positions 
which will always require an army to dig them out after, and I repeat after, the 
Air has gained supremacy. Directly the Air has gained supremacy the Army 
must be ready to go in and capture or destroy the enemy’s bases otherwise 
there is a real danger of the enemy recovering in the Air and our Air having to 
fight for supremacy all over again. In long years of peace armies will be able to 
organise positions underground and in caves from which they will have to be 
turned out by opposing armies.
3. The Navy as we have known the British Royal Navy for 250 years or more 
which made and maintained Empire for all this time, will be completely 
changed owing to the power of the Air being so much greater over navies than 
over armies.
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4. It has been shown in this war that Air will be the chief weapon, in some 
cases the only weapon, against surface ships. It will be the chief weapon 
against submarines, although small very fast surface vessels and submarines 
will still be required.
 Submarines have proved that they are a most formidable weapon 
against shipping at sea, and our submarines have done magnificent work in 
this war and have sunk millions of tons of the enemy’s shipping.
 THEY WILL STILL BE A FORMIDABLE WEAPON OF THE 
FUTURE.
 Though Air may be the best counter to them at present, even so they 
will remain a powerful weapon.
 Our navy will require much larger submarine fleets and many more 
small fast surface craft than ever before.
The Navy as we have known it, sad though it may be, will be profoundly 
changed, and the earlier this is recognised the better for the British Empire 
and the world. Though the Navy have done magnificent and the personnel 
have shown as always, great fighting qualities, great powers of endurance, and 
great determination, can we say that their weapons (that is their ships) have 
really been the best type of weapons with which they could have fought, even 
in these days? And what revolutionary changes will they not have to make in 
their weapons for the future?
Extract from a report issued by the Prime Minister and General Smuts 
on the Prime Minister’s Committee on Air Organisation and Home Defence, 
dated 17th August, 1917:-
 “And the day may not be far off when aerial operations with their  
 devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous  
 centres on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war, to  
 which the older forms of military and naval operations may become  
 secondary and subordinate.”
I feel that those whose responsibility it is to arrange for the future 
prevention of wars, or the quick suppression of any that break out in the world 
and in the Empire, should consider the statements I have made in this note, 
particularly those in authority in the four great powers, the British Empire, 
America, Russia and China.
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‘The Principles of Air Power in War’
From “LUNA HABITABILIS” – by Thomas gray – 1737 
The time will come, when thou shalt lift thine eyes
To watch a long-drawn battle in the skies, 
While aged peasants, too amazed for words,
Stare at the flying fleets of wondrous birds.
England, so long the mistress of the sea, 
Where winds and waves confess her sovereignty, 
Her ancient triumphs yet on high shall bear,
And reign, the sovereign of the conquered air.
FOREWORD
I have endeavoured to make plain in this pamphlet what part Air Power 
has played in victory over Germany, particularly in 1944-45, and to show how 
it has been based on the four great principles of Air Power.
These four principles were conceived on the day the Air was conquered. 
They have stood the stress of war, to enable Air Power to save countless 
casualties both in the field and at sea.
I have not dealt in these notes with the Air Force intervening in the 
battle, which is, of course, of primary importance. This demands a separate 
note, as it comes more under what I would call the Methods of using the Air 
Force in battle, and which has been dealt with fully in various excellent official 
documents which have been issued by the Army and Air Force.
TRENCHARD.
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AIR POWER IN 1944-45
To understand the principles of Air Power it is necessary to refer to 
the Great War of 1914-18. In that, this nation suffered millions of casualties 
and there grew up the idea that there was no generalship, no leadership, no 
foresight, no imagination, whereas the truth was that it was the first great 
war that used weapons of a power never dreamt of in the past. The rate of 
fire of an enormous number of different types of weapons, the terrific effect 
of newly developed explosives, gas, barbed wire and all the new weapons 
and devices which the ingenuity of science had brought into existence, made 
destructive power on land and sea greater than had ever been foreseen in the 
past. This terrific fire power, combined with nature’s obstacles, the hills and 
valleys, the swamps and deserts, the rocks and the streams and the rivers, made 
land warfare a costly shambles, and war had become a series of what in the 
phrase of the day was called “blood baths” in which victory was only one of 
exhaustion.
A good deal was said in those days to the effect that war had become a 
stalemate – that to win any major military operation meant wiping out the life 
of a whole generation at least. There were no flanks to turn; tactical surprises 
could still be utilised, but it was difficult to bring about strategical surprises.
In this war all that was changed. The stalemates and seemingly 
meaningless shambles of “the trenches” gave way to a war of movement 
and manoeuvre: above all the casualties suffered by our armies in reaching a 
decision were far lower. It was Air Power which made this fundamental change 
in the nature of warfare.
I will state here in a few words what are the four great principles of Air 
Power.
They are very similar to the principles of sea power, which shortly put 
are:- (1) To defeat the enemy’s fleet; (2) To keep open the oceans for our 
warships and merchant ships; (3) To deny the use of the seas to the enemy. 
The four principles of Air Power were and are:-
 1. To obtain Mastery of the Air, and to keep it, which means  
   continuously fighting for it.
 2. To Destroy the Enemy’s Means of Production and his  
   Communications in his Own Country, that is by strategic  
   bombing force.
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 3. To Maintain the Battle without any Interference by the  
   Enemy, which means to enable the Commanders to build up the  
   colossal supplies and reinforcements necessary for the battle, and  
   to be able to maintain them without interruption by the enemy.
 4. To Prevent the Enemy being able to maintain the Battle,  
   that is, to prevent him being able to build up adequate supplies  
   for his Armies or Navies or Air Force.
The above principles were implicit in air power as used even in the 
war of 1914-18, but the technical means for their application were not then 
sufficiently developed to give air power the influence which it has exercised 
in 1939-45. The war of 1914-18 was, it must be remembered, the first major 
war of long duration between great land powers which had taken place for 100 
years, and one in which there were enormous developments in every type of 
warlike weapon, and vast increase in their destructive power.
Had there been no Air Power, in the opinion of the writer and many 
other thinking people, the present war would have wiped out not only a 
generation, but the whole life of the nations, and then it would probably 
have ended in a stalemate. There would certainly have been no El Alamein, 
no Tunisia, no landing in Italy, no landing in Normandy, no break-out 
of the Normandy peninsula, and no crossing of the Rhine, and NO 
DESTRUCTION OF GERMANY and crippling of German war economy.
It follows from the last two principles of Air Power that when armies 
meet and one side can maintain the battle, and the other side is prevented 
from doing so, there can be but one result. After the army has won such a 
battle, it will exploit the result of air power to the fullest possible extent, and 
nothing will then be able to stop a well led and efficient army, except running 
out of their own supplies. And even in this case, air supply can do much to 
solve the supply problems set by weather, by mud, by frost, by snow, and by 
rain.
At the beginning of the war in 1939 there was little air fighting and no 
offensive action against Germany. This was on account of political reasons, 
and also because of pressure from the French who feared the effects of 
counter-attack. In April, 1940, however, the battle for Air Power in France 
began and our air power there was overwhelmed. The Germans exploited 
their mastery of the air in France to the full; we were unable to maintain 
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our battle in France, while the Germans with their more powerful air force 
could do so, and they drove us to the beaches of Dunkirk. Here at Dunkirk 
began our real battle for the command of the air. Fortunately, the Royal Air 
Force, based on England had sufficient range to cover the beaches of Dunkirk 
and sufficient strength at the critical point to enable the evacuation of over 
300,000 men with relatively little loss caused by the German Air Force. But 
it was only done by means of almost superhuman exertions on the part of the 
small Air Force in England; and immediately after Dunkirk the BATTLE OF 
BRITAIN began.
To enlarge on the Battle of Britain is outside the scope of this paper, 
although it should be recalled not only that we won the battle, but that it was 
the only battle the loss of which could have meant the loss of the war.
However, the mastery of the air, which we had obtained at home, had 
to be fought for continuously. The enemy was always apt to recover his 
offensive power in the air. At this stage in the war therefore we had to apply 
PRINCIPLE NUMBER TWO, namely hitting at the enemy’s sources of war 
production and communications, with our bombers. For such offensive air 
activity was essential towards retaining our mastery in the air even over our 
own country. Our sustained attacks on Germany had had the effect of bringing 
the enemy’s fighter force up into the air, and forcing him to concentrate his 
air power in the defence of his industries. In a word, the enemy’s air power 
was pinned on to the defensive. At length in 1944, there came a time when 
our air supremacy got ever greater; the enemy was only willing to engage our 
attacking bomber forces from time to time. The continuous offensive of the 
bomber force is vital in order to maintain the Mastery in the Air; its power to 
interfere with the enemy’s communications and war production as a whole is 
also a method by which it achieves the destruction of the enemy’s air power.
The Mastery of the Air and the Attack on the enemy’s production 
resources and communications are thus closely interlocked. Naturally, as 
soon as the mastery of the air, both at home and abroad, has been confirmed, 
the enemy’s productive system as a whole falls a prey to our bombers. That 
is all a logical consequence of the mastery of the air. In short, the mastery 
of the air was far from being obtained finally for us in the Battle of Britain. 
Nevertheless, it was obtained temporarily over Britain, and that was the first 
and most important step to final victory, viz., a secure base in England. 
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The battle of the air was fought in the Western desert, over Malta, and in 
the Mediterranean generally, and that mastery was obtained in the end in each 
case. But all this was only part of the general fight for air mastery. The enemy 
could not send his best types of fighters and pilots to the Mediterranean in 
sufficient numbers as he had to have them at home to attempt to maintain his 
security there. It was all one air battle, but the effects of losing it were felt first 
by the enemy at his extremities. We thus obtained a definite air superiority 
which the enemy never afterwards could wrest from us though he challenged 
us at different times, until the final crossing of the Rhine when the Luftwaffe 
really had collapsed.
As we gradually obtained air superiority, helped enormously by the work 
of the bomber offensive, so automatically could bomber offensive increase its 
power in destroying the enemy’s means of production and his communications 
in his own country.
It should be remembered that the bomber offensive must be by 
day and by night. This was obtained in 1943, 1944 and 1945 when their 
communications were almost completely destroyed and their production, 
especially of oil, greatly reduced. This in the end prevented them from 
maintaining the battle.
It is generally known that at the start of this war we were unprepared 
in the Navy, the Army and the Air Force, more particularly in the Army and 
the Air Force. The Navy luckily was immeasurably superior to the German 
Navy in September, 1939, before the Bismarck was ready for sea or the Tirpitz 
completed, with the exception that the Germans had more submarines and 
more small craft.
The Air Force was smaller than the German Luftwaffe, and we had very 
few bombers compared with the Germans.
The Army was the worst off of all the three Services and acknowledged 
to be the most poorly equipped army that had been sent overseas in my life 
time.
Notwithstanding, due to the Commanders and Staffs, and the brilliant 
work of all in the Royal Air Force, the Air Force won through and saved the 
world.
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The spirit and training of our pilots were incomparably superior to 
the Germans. Second, our very few fighters were superior to the German 
fighters owing to our machines being equipped with 8 guns. This showed 
great foresight on the part of the Air staff who placed quality before quantity. 
Events have proved the wisdom of this policy beyond all doubt. The 
determination and the continuous battle of the Bomber Commands of the two 
Forces, the U.S. Army Air Force and the British Air Force, in spite of their 
heavy casualties carried on the terrific war without interruption for the last 
three years until Germany collapsed.
The Costal Command carried out relentlessly their work in the Atlantic 
and finally they were largely responsible for winning the Battle of the Atlantic.
Last, but not least, the four principles of Air Power were recognised by 
the Air Staff who, in spite of criticism and opposition, firmly stuck to them.
PART 2
I have in the following pages added a few notes on what the Air Forces 
have done in support of one or other of the four principles of Air Power.
Recently a Joint Statement on strategic bombing by the United States 
Air Force and the Royal Air Force in Europe has been officially issued, in 
which it has been stated:
“The immense destruction done to all keypoints on the railways 
of north-west Europe is well known. The effect on the mobility of 
the German reserves was disastrous, and the Allied build-up proved 
to be far more rapid than that of the enemy. The journey of two 
Panzer divisions from the Eastern front is a clear indication of the 
difficulties which the enemy had to face. The two divisions had raced 
across Germany in 72 trains, each division using three lines with 12 
trains on each. But when they got to Nancy, in Eastern France, it 
was found that they could only proceed from there to Paris at the 
rate of eight trains a day instead of seventy-two.”
Even these eight trains did not get through to Paris!
The devastating results of the raids on the fighter aircraft factories in 
Germany are now well known. They were almost obliterated and had to be 
dispersed all over Germany. It is also well known what the bomber force did in 
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knocking out Peenamunde, the experimental station of V1 and V2. In addition 
the bomber force destroyed all the launching sites of V1. New ones had to be 
made and this put back the German offensive of these weapons six months.
Again, there was the destruction of enemy oil production. 
It is officially stated that:-
“Before the campaign began Germany had a normal monthly 
output of 1,344,000 tons of all oil products, and of 532,000 tons of 
motor and aviation fuel. By September of 1944, the output of all 
oil products was down to 310,000 tons, 23 per cent. of the original 
figure, and of motor and aviation fuel down to 105,000 tons, 20 per 
cent. of the original figure.”
“The great refineries at Ploesti, Rumania, were the first large 
oil targets for the Fifteenth, and a long series of attacks reduced 
Rumanian gasoline production from 155,700 tons per month in 
March, 1944, to 15,400 in August when captured by the Russian 
Army.”
The devastation of the munition factories and centres of production in 
Germany has to be seen to be believed. This devastation caused by a never 
ceasing attack forced a vast dispersal of the means of production and the 
placing of a great deal of the production underground which meant utilising 
man power. This is sufficient to show the value of the PRINCIPLES ONE 
AND TWO and their effect on PRINCIPLE FOUR, namely, to prevent the 
enemy being able to maintain the battle.
It is also interesting to see how the 2nd Tactical Air Force CARRIED 
OUT THE FOUR AIR PRINCIPLES.
I had the privilege of visiting the Normandy peninsula at the end of 
July, 1944, and I saw the harbour full of ships, and all the roads packed with 
transport going up to the battle front. Every field was full of tanks, guns and 
men, and all kinds of supplies; seldom could there have been so many men and 
such a colossal amount of supply in such a small area. Yet for the two days I 
was there I never once heard an anti-aircraft gun fire or anyone look up to see 
whether the machines overhead were our aircraft or theirs. They knew they 
were ours, which is, maintaining the battle.
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     I was also informed that a German Colonel who was captured while I 
was there reported that he had to march his Battalion for 19 nights running, 
10 to 15 miles a night, because there were no means of transportation left 
either by railway or lorries for reaching the battle front.
     The above shows how the Air Forces carried out the third and fourth 
principles of Air Power.
THE POWER OF THE AIR OVER THE SEAS
Coastal Command
I have often stated that there are no barriers in the air save weather, and 
the same Air Power that has such a tremendous effect over the land has even a 
greater effect over the sea.
It must not ever be forgotten that the Air Force has in these last 5 years 
become a primary factor in sea power. I do not speak only of the proofs that 
have been afforded in the closing months of the war of the validity of the 
airman’s old claim to be able to sink the most modern capital ship. A far more 
dangerous threat to our existence as a maritime Empire than ever was formed 
by Tirpitz, Lutzow or Scheer was the U-boat. And in the critical year of the 
U-boat war – 1943 – it was the air more than anything else that killed the U-
boat menace to our life-line, the Atlantic convoys. Once the famous “gap” was 
closed by the very long range shore based aircraft in the “North Atlantic”, that 
menace was killed – though we cannot be sure that it would not have arisen 
in a different form had the war gone on long enough. That a new and more 
dangerous type of U-boat did not appear in strength on our trade routes was 
largely due to the devastating bombardment of the building yards, and the 
component factories throughout the “Reich”.
This however was the defensive side – the share of air power in 
maintaining our own battle. Great though the contribution of Coastal 
Command was to our victory at sea, it would not be altogether surprising if 
history shows in time that Bomber Command’s share was even more decisive. 
Apart from the indirect effect of the Bomber offensive, I believe it is difficult 
to overstate the effect on the enemy’s war potential of the incessant mining 
of waters closed to all but air forces. That, and Coastal Command’s strikes 
against his Norwegian and Dutch coast traffic, crippled the enemy’s sea 
borne supply, and put an intolerable strain upon his land communications, 
themselves subject to constant air attack.
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Finally, let us not forget the Mediterranean. No one underrates the 
great work of our submarines and light naval forces in that sea. But the factor 
which set the seal on Rommel’s fate in Africa was our air attack on his supply 
lines from ITALY and GREECE to BENGHAZI and TOBRUK. If there was 
one thing more than any other which in Africa – as finally in Europe – spelt 
disaster for the Germans, it was shortage of oil. And it was the Air that sent 
Rommel’s tankers to the bottom within sight of the AFRICAN shore.
In the Mediterranean, as in all seas, it is Air Power that finally enables us 
to maintain our battle and prevents the enemy from maintaining his.
It is interesting and of value to quote, in support of the above, what one 
or two senior German Generals out of many thought about the Allied Air 
Power, for instance:-
Field Marshal von Rundstedt after his capture gave his opinions to 
some war correspondents in which he said he believed the greatest factor 
in Germany’s defeat was the strategic bombing by the Allied Air Forces, 
particularly the systematic destruction of German communications, railways 
and bridges. He also stated that his object in his Ardennes offensive was to 
take Liege and hold the line of the Meuse, and the chief reason it failed was 
because of the air attacks on his communications, which stopped the Germans 
bringing up all reinforcements and supplies.
Field-Marshal Kesselring, after his capture, stated the three reasons why 
Germany was defeated, were:-
1. Allied strategic bombing behind the German lines.
2. Attacks by low-flying Allied fighter aircraft, and 
3. Terror raids against the German civilian population.
What is more important is what they said to their own troops while the 
battle was still on.
Field-Marshal von Rundstedt wrote in a captured order issued on the 
20th June, 1944, a fortnight after the Invasion and nearly ten months before 
the collapse of Germany:-
1. “The enemy’s complete mastery in the air.”
2. “Enemy’s Air Force – almost unlimited in radius, it controls in  
 numbers not only the main battlefield but also the approach and  
 supply roads to a depth of 150 or 200 km. Moreover, the enemy  
 carries the battle right into the home battlefront with his tactical  
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 bombers, in order to destroy the large railway systems especially  
 railway junctions, marshalling yards, locomotive shops, bridges and  
 important works connected with the War industry.”
He further wrote on D-Day that it was the bombing which destroyed 
the German communications, and that “Railroad transport which anyhow, 
because of the total traffic situation, has been reduced to a certain minimum, 
can scarcely be brought nearer than 200-250 kilometres from the front; and 
this, too, without any planned schedule. The sections of railway lines change 
hourly, according to the weather conditions; the trains may be in close 
succession (buffer to buffer) or they may travel only at night.”
Field-Marshal von Model, in an order that was captured, wrote on the 
1st November, 1944, that the hostile Air Force was his enemy No. 1. He went 
on to say that it rendered movement in the rear areas impossible.
This order was issued to his own Army. He did not say the movement in 
the rear area was made difficult, he said impossible.
WHAT WAS THE ULTIMATE EFFECT?
Our foe suffered some millions of casualties, I suggest because he would 
not keep to the principles of air warfare. Where we employed a separate Air 
Force under an air plan which was part of the general military plan, his great 
military tradition overwhelmed him: he handed the Luftwaffe over to the 
Wehrmacht, to be used piece-meal.
What did the effort cost us in this war compared with the last war?
The terrific battle of Germany waged by the Bomber Command since 
the Battle of Britain cost:-
Killed    …    44,458                              Missing    …    10,458
Since the beginning of the war the total cost to Bomber Command alone 
has been:-
  Killed    …    46,929                            Missing    …    10,495
    
In the missing I have not included those who are now known to have 
been liberated or have returned as repatriated Prisoners of War. Therefore, it 
is fair to assume that what I have got under the heading of Missing are now 
mainly fatal casualties, making a total of fatal casualties for Bomber Command 
in the Battle of Germany of some 57,000.
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The Air Force as a whole since the Battle of Britain has lost:-
Killed    …    75,126                              Missing    …    16,085
From the beginning of the war the Air Force as a whole has lost:-
Killed    …    80,378                              Missing    …    16,233
The same considerations apply to the numbers missing as stated above.
To assess broadly the total cost of the war against Germany, casualties in 
all theatres have been included, excepting the Far Eastern theatre.
From the beginning of August, 1943, to the 30th April, 1945, the cost of 
the war in Europe to the Army and Navy in fatal casualties has been:-
Navy     …     14,036                             Army     …     56,552
while the cost to the Air Force in killed and missing has been 45,940.
Again, the same considerations, as mentioned above, have been taken 
into account in computing the Air Force casualties.
Whereas during the 52 months of the Great War the total casualties 
suffered by the British Commonwealth and Empire Forces were 3,286,090, of 
which 996,230 were deaths, in the 66 months of the World War, that is to the 
end of February, 1945, the total casualties were 1,128,315, of which 307,201 
were deaths.
This shows how the Air Force saved casualties in the Army and Navy.
What is the reason for these discrepancies, which have occurred in spite 
of a truly tremendous increase in fire power, afloat and ashore. I suggest the 
answer lies in our correct use of the four principles of Air Power to which the 
Wright Brothers gave silent birth when they first flew at Kittihawk in 1903.
It may be that I have put too much weight, though I don’t think so, upon 
what the captured German Commanders say, but the whole German nation 
says the same.
In order to substantiate this, I would like to add what Field Marshal 
Montgomery said in his notes on the use of Air Power in support of land 
operations, under the heading of The Basic Fundamentals:-
(a) “It is necessary to win the air battle before embarking on the land  
 battle. If this is not done, then operations on land will be conducted  
 at a great disadvantage.”
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(b) “It is not possible to conduct successful offensive operations on land
 against an enemy with a superior Air Force, other things being
 equal. The enemy’s Air Force must be subdued before the land 
 offensive is launched.”
I would like to quote Field Marshal Montgomery’s telegram of 
congratulation to the Chief of the Air Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, 
Sir Charles Portal:-
“In 21st Army Group we have no Germans left to fight in western 
Europe.”
“At this historic moment I feel I would like to express to you, the 
head of the R.A.F. the deep sense of gratitude that we soldiers owe 
to you and your splendid force. The mighty weapon of air power has 
enabled us, firstly, to win a great victory with fewer casualties than 
would otherwise have been the case. We are all deeply conscious of 
these facts. The brave and brilliant work of your gallant pilots and 
crews, and the devotion to duty of the ground staffs, have aroused 
our profound admiration. I would be grateful if you would convey 
the gratitude of myself and of all those serving under me to all your 
commanders, both senior and junior, and to all ranks throughout the 
Royal Air Force. And perhaps you would include a special word of 
greeting and good wishes from myself personally to every officer and 
man in the Royal Air Force.”
This surely shows how the Commander-in-Chief recognises the power of Air, 
and his appreciation of its uses.
In conclusion I take an extract from “The War in the Air” (Volume II, Page 
164) which is the official history of the last war in the air.
The Policy of the Strategic Air Offensive.
“But it was not alone the new aeroplanes which accounted for the 
British superiority; it was as much the policy which directed their 
use to ensure the maximum effect being obtained. This policy is 
fundamental and must be considered at some length. It is founded 
on nothing more than the principle of the offensive. That principle 
may seem to some so beautifully simple as to be almost axiomatic. 
But it was an axiom which the German command learned only after 
bitter and costly experience, and one which found highly-placed 
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disputants on the British side. The moral effect of aircraft attack 
is so great that those who are attacked from the air always call for 
protection. If a town is bombed there is at once a clamorous demand 
for aeroplanes to prevent the enemy doing such a thing again. If a 
bombing squadron blows up a munition dump, protection for all 
other munition dumps is demanded. One aeroplane flying over front 
line troops and attacking them with machine-gun fire may be feared 
by many thousands of men, and the question at once arises, why are 
not our own machines on the spot to attack it as soon as it appears? 
There is, indeed, in time of war a constant pressure exerted from 
many directions for a dissipation of air power, but that pressure, if 
yielded to, is fatal. Aeroplanes cannot be distributed like policemen 
across the face of the earth. The air service must carry the war into 
enemy territory and keep it there. The air war becomes a test of 
nervous endurance. The nation which keeps a stiff upper lip, and 
whose air service adheres to its determined offensive, of course will, 
in the end, secure the greatest measure of protection from the air for 
all its various activities.”
Others in years to come will write the full history, but I have to put 
together these short notes in order to try and show what I feel all in the 
Royal Air Force broadly think is the true meaning of Air Power. I feel sure 
that history will faithfully show what we owe to our great leaders, and all the 
Commanders and Officers and Men of the aircrews, and all men and women 
wherever they served in the Royal Air Force under the leadership of Marshal 
of the R.A.F. Sir Charles Portal.
 
May I pay my tribute to all those in the Royal Air Force who 
have laid down their lives in this War.
 They met with Death
And nonchalantly passed the time of day;
“Immortals these,” he said beneath his breath,
And put his scythe away.
                                                                          Quotation.
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‘Air Power and National Security’
FOREWORD
In October, 1943, I wrote a rather controversial pamphlet called “THE 
EFFECT OF THE RISE OF AIR POWER ON WAR”, which I revised in 
1944. In May 1945, when the war against Germany was won, I wrote “THE 
PRINCIPLES OF AIR POWER”.
This pamphlet deals with the future defence of this Empire as influenced 
by Air Power.
TRENCHARD. 
It will take years to assess fully and correctly all the lessons of six years 
of world-wide war on sea and on land and in the air; and in the present 
unsettled condition, both political and international, it will also take time 
before the defence commitments of the British Empire can reach any stability. 
These facts make it difficult to frame any long-range defence policy for the 
maintenance and protection of the British Empire. Yet it is imperative that 
we shall be able to protect ourselves and to make our contribution to the 
ensurement of peace. For that purpose a policy is needed which will cover 
our essential needs for the next 15 or 20 years. If we start now to mould 
our defences in a shape that is broadly sound, readjustments can be made 
later as the lessons of the war become assimilated and applied to post-war 
developments.
The two pamphlets that I wrote during the war were written with the 
object of bringing out some of the most important principles on the use of 
Air Power, from the point of view of winning the war. The passage of time 
has proved them to be correct, and there is nothing in them that I find it 
necessary to change. The object of the present pamphlet, now that the war 
is over, is to apply these principles to our future needs, and in the light of 
them to formulate our ideas on the general shape of our defence forces and 
on the allocation of that part of the national income and resources that the 
Government devotes to our defence.
The biggest point of all those that we have to consider is the fact that in 
modern times it is essential to control the air before we can operate effectively 
on the land, on the sea, or in the air itself. Indeed the same governing factor 
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applies to the ability to carry on anything approaching normal life and 
essential industries in any country. This fact is now widely accepted and has 
been particularly stressed both by General Eisenhower and by Field-Marshal 
Viscount Montgomery. 
The four principles on the use of Air Power that I set out were;-
1. To Obtain Mastery of the Air, and to keep it, which means  
 continuously fighting for it.
2. To Destroy the Enemy’s Means of Production and his  
 Communications in his Own Country, that is by strategic bombing  
 force.
3. To Maintain the Battle without any interference by the Enemy,  
 which means to enable the Commanders to build up the colossal supplies  
 and reinforcements necessary for the battle, and to be able to maintain  
 them without interruption by the enemy.
4. To Prevent the Enemy being able to Maintain the Battle, that is, to  
 prevent him being able to build up the adequate supplies for his Armies  
 or Navies or Air Forces.
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SOME BASIC FACTS.
Before we can consider the future we must assemble some of the 
essential facts against which we can consider the outstanding and guiding 
principles, taking into account our recent experience. It would be a grave 
mistake (but one which is easy to make) to allow the latter part of the last 
war to dominate our minds, and to take our lessons from that period when 
victory was assured. The real lessons of war must embrace the early days, that 
is when we were inferior to the enemy, or only equal in power to the enemy. 
We must give full weight to the early days and to such occurrences as our 
defeats in POLAND, in FRANCE, in NORTH AFRICA, in SOMALILAND, 
at PEARL HARBOUR, and in SINGAPORE, and we must remember the 
narrow margin by which we achieved victory in the BATTLE OF BRITAIN. 
THIS IS IMPORTANT. Surely this is plain, as in the latter part of this war 
we were overwhelmingly superior in manpower and materials to the enemy. 
We must not assume this is always going to be so, because then we are sowing 
seeds for setbacks as we did in the early days of the 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 
wars.
It must be remembered that there is not, and will not be unlimited 
manpower for the requirements of the British Empire. Our resources are 
strictly and severely limited, as the 1939-1945 war proved beyond argument. 
Raw material is also strictly limited. Moreover, owing to technical 
and scientific development all three Services require a greater backing of 
manpower for a given size of force than was needed in 1914-1918. Therefore, 
we cannot afford to squander either manpower or materials on second-best 
weapons of war, nor can we assume that time will be on our side.
We must consider the amount of manpower, materials and time that will 
be available for military purposes in peace, and the use that we are to make 
of them, for on this will depend the value that we get from them when an 
emergency descends upon us. It would be a waste of money and time to build 
a weapon which, though it could be used and might even be useful, is not 
the best weapon for the work. It might, for example, take double the expense 
and many times longer, and much more manpower to build, than some other 
weapon which, although perhaps less conventional, can do the work more 
efficiently and cheaply.
America and England, though independent Powers in all their glory 
and in all their individualism, and although they are two separate nations for 
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all normal purposes, are, never the less, as one for the purposes of war. Their 
ideals are the same, their broad outlook on the world is the same and their 
military ideas very similar, and no one outside a lunatic asylum would take 
into account a possible conflict between these two nations.
VULNERABILITY.
The Untied Kingdom is in a particularly isolated and vulnerable position 
in relation to any enemy which is in control of the whole or of a major part 
of the mainland of Europe. This is all the more important because of the 
concentration of the greater part of the industrial capacity and the white 
inhabitants of the entire British Commonwealth and Empire in the small 
space of our home islands.
ATOMIC ENERGY AND OTHER MODERN DEVELOPMENTS.
Another fact that has got to be realised is the power of the atom bomb. 
Whatever may be the outcome of peace conferences and the international 
control of atomic energy, the fact is that this potent weapon is now in 
existence. It is a factor that we must consider in all our defence problems, 
and its effect is to increase the vulnerability of our population and industrial 
resources.  The chief counter to the atom bomb is the Air Force and anti-
aircraft guns, whether it is carried by rockets, by pilotless aeroplanes or 
ordinary aeroplanes. 
The atom bomb in its present state of development will be launched from-
 1. Piloted aircraft.
 2. Pilotless aircraft.
 3. Long-distance rockets.
With regard to-
 1. It is my belief that piloted aircraft will be the normal method of  
  launching the atom bomb for the immediate future, and the chief  
  counter to this will be the defending aircraft and anti-aircraft guns.
 2. Pilotless aircraft may be used for shorter or medium distances. This 
  again can be countered by anti-aircraft guns, aircraft and improved  
  balloons.
 3. It is possible that the long-distance rockets can be made in the next
  15 to 20 years moderately accurate. Then the atom bomb might
  render the Air Force as we know it to-day as obsolete as battleships  
  and aircraft carriers are to-day. But that stage has not yet been  
  reached and there is danger in looking too far ahead.
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I am dealing in this paper only with the needs and problems of the next 
20 years, and I believe that the balance of scientific opinion is that within this 
period the use of atom bombs from rockets is not likely to be a major factor. 
Apart from the atom bomb, we have to keep before us the fully demonstrated 
fact of the increases in power and accuracy of the ordinary types of bomb-
carrying aircraft.
UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION.
All this leads up to the conclusion that quite apart from ideals and our 
inherent preference for peace, from the purely material and practical point 
of view it is greatly to our interest that the U.N.O. should be a powerful and 
effective body which will control the world on the lines of the law courts 
and police force in our own country. But again, unregenerate human nature 
comes into the picture, and it will be many years before we can feel certain 
that we can risk our entire future on the effective operation of the U.N.O. in 
any circumstances in which our peace may be threatened. In the intervening 
period one of the most effective contributions we can make to the United 
Nations is to build our own defences into an effective organisation which, as 
all the world knows, will add to the strength of the United Nations and the 
cause of Peace.
TRANSPORTATION.
We depend for our very existence on our ability to import large 
quantities of food and raw materials. In war the increased vulnerability of 
our industrial and internal distribution system will lead to an increased need 
for importation and will add materially to our requirements for importing 
manufactured articles when, in spite of the efforts of our defence forces, we 
must assume that the attack will at least interfere with our production and 
with the ability of our ports and internal transportation to distribute food and 
other essentials.
During the last two wars the Navy has talked about the Merchant 
“Navy” and not the Merchant “Fleet”. I feel there is some confusion of 
thought here and that a clearer definition is required. To my mind we mean 
sea transportation, which is as important to the other two Services and to 
the life of the country as it is to the Navy. As far ahead as we can foresee, sea 
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transportation will be vitally important to the Commonwealth, but I venture 
to ask the authorities to look well ahead. I used to say that what the air could 
carry in merchandise, or munitions, or machinery of war, was negligible 
compared with what could be carried by sea. I say now that I think I was 
wrong in using the word negligible. It will no longer be negligible, and I feel 
that our handling of air transport in this last war was wrong and that our 
outlook is still wrong.
To quote some figures. I understand that in one year of the war alone, 
1,000,000 tons were carried by Allied Air Forces over the Hump from Burma 
to China, from improvised and inadequate aerodromes and with improvised 
and inadequate aircraft, when Burma and China were really almost side-
shows and the war against Germany in Europe and the war against Japan in 
the Pacific was still proceeding. From past statistics I find that the following 
tonnages of merchandise were imported and exported from the great port of 
London:-
Year ended 31st March                                          Tons
1935                                                    36,161,000
1936                                                    37,799,000
1937                                                    39,354,000
1938                                                    40,910,000
and the following tonnages imported and exported from Nigeria:-
                                                                   Tons
1936                                                      1,621,744
1937                                                      1,950,494  
1938                                                      1,490,787
1939                                                      1,453,322
I repeat what I have said before, that I believe sea transportation is, and 
will remain, essential to us. But I consider these figures show that the air is no 
longer negligible as a carrying factor in emergency, more particularly when 
we consider the vulnerability of other forms of transport and the difficulties of 
distribution by conventional transport in war.
Imagine what could have been carried with up-to-date aerodromes, up-
to-date aircraft and modern radar equipment etc. We now have jet-propelled 
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aircraft and other developments that were used in the latter days of the war, 
and I consider that it is not too much to say that in another 10 or 15 years it 
would be possible to carry in and out of this country 10,000,000 to 15,000,000 
tons by air, which is not a negligible figure. It may be claimed that this would 
be uneconomical, but is there any reason why these jet-propelled aircraft 
should not cost very considerably less than the petrol driven engines?
No form of transportation ever really dies out. Every new form is 
an addition to, and not a substitution for, an old form of transportation. 
Originally people walked and carried loads on their heads and backs; then they 
had dogs and donkeys carrying their loads, and then pre-historic carts. Then 
came railways and motor cars, and still all these forms of transportation were 
used. Camels and mules are still used in some parts of the world, and have to 
be. There is always room for transportation of all sorts.
Here in England, Airways House was built only a few years ago to 
accommodate 400 to 500 passengers a day leaving London, and now there 
are over 1,000 being carried from London alone. Is it too much to say that in 
another 5 to 10 years at least 15,000 to 20,000 more people will be carried out 
of London per day by air?
DOMINION COLLABORATION.
The British Commonwealth is a United Nations Organisation in 
miniature. In the case of a threat or an attack on any of the Dominions they 
would depend to a large extent on our support and help, and we, in our turn, 
depend upon them even more in modern times than we did in the past. A close 
understanding and collaboration in defence matters between the independent 
members of the British Commonwealth is therefore a commonsense 
precaution for all of us and in no sense any sort of a threat to the peace or the 
integrity of other people. In fact, a healthy and strong British Commonwealth 
is an essential factor in a settled peace.
These are what I call the main facts on which we should base our defence 
plans; there are many others, but I want to keep this pamphlet short.
Now I come to consider the problems that affect our organisation 
for war, and the role of our Fighting Services, based on the facts and the 
principles that I have enumerated above.
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WHAT TYPE OF OPPOSITION SHOULD THE THREE 
FIGHTING FORCES BE PREPARED TO MEET?
1. AIR FORCES.
It is plain that the most dangerous weapons the Air Force will have to meet 
in the years to come will be missiles that arrive by air. In days of old our 
existence depended on our ability to use the sea and to prevent our enemies 
from using it freely. In modern days, the developments in the air mean that 
an enemy can achieve the same effect in an infinitely shorter space of time 
by direct attack upon our home islands, which would of course include our 
ports, our shipping, and our internal transportation and distribution systems. 
Whether these missiles are conveyed by rockets, by pilotless aircraft, or by 
comparatively conventional aeroplanes is immaterial to my argument. They 
arrive by air, and it is primarily Air Power, of one sort or another, that we must 
rely upon to counter them. We must remember the early days of the last war 
and our intense anxiety in the days when our still small Air Force held our 
future in its hands in exactly the same way as Drake’s small fleet was our sole 
defence against the Armada. It is certain that in any future attack our survival 
will depend on our ability to obtain and retain mastery of the air over and 
about our own homeland as a first requirement. Wars cannot, however, be 
won by defence alone and we must, therefore, be prepared to hit as well as to 
defend, both to strike at the source of the attack upon us when we must, and 
to act as a deterrent to any potential aggressor.
Looking even further ahead and drawing now on the lessons of the 
war, we have abundant evidence that Armies and Navies are powerless unless 
we control the Air, thus enabling them to get on with their job without 
prohibitive casualties and interference, and to prevent the enemy being able 
to maintain the battle. I do not propose to labour this point. Suffice it to say 
that those great leaders General Eisenhower and Field-Marshal Viscount 
Montgomery have repeatedly and unreservedly accepted this view as proven 
and beyond doubt. To take just one naval example, all the traditional gallantry 
of our Navy failed to hold off the attack upon Crete, and the arrival of the 
German armies in North Africa. It was not enemy NAVAL power that 
prevented our sailors from performing these tasks. It was the fact that the 
enemy controlled the AIR, and the naval losses that we sustained during the 
campaign in Crete were inevitable under the conditions. No Navy could 
have done more under the conditions, no other Navy would have done 
as much, but the cold fact remains that naval power was impotent to 
achieve the desired result. To my mind there can be no other conclusion 
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than that the development of Air Power in its broadest sense, and including 
the development of all means of combating missiles that travel through the air, 
whether fired or dropped, is the first essential to our survival in war.
2. ARMIES
Armies will be required first of all to support the air-services with anti-aircraft 
guns in the defence of our homeland. They will also be required to enable 
Air Power to be used effectively in the later stages of the campaign. They will 
be required to meet the enemy’s Armies that will be used in his own country 
(or in other countries that he has over-run) to defend the bases from which 
he will be launching his air attacks upon us. We must anticipate that the Air 
Force will have to assist our Army to occupy the sites from which these air 
weapons can be launched, and amphibious strategy will again come into its 
own, and we, in company with our Allies, will need to participate in land 
fighting and launch Armies, whether they land from ships or from the air, to 
keep the enemy from coming to close grips with us, or to occupy his country 
and to bring about his ultimate defeat. Modern development does mean, 
however, that Armies must be even more HIGHLY TRAINED AND MORE 
EFFICIENTLY EQUIPPED AND MORE MOBILE than they were even 
in the last war. Armies will still be required to do police work. In other words, 
Armies, even though they may be numerically smaller than in the past, will be 
more important than ever.
3. NAVIES
With regard to Navies; here I consider we must face a major change in our 
traditional outlook. We must get away from all preconceived ideas of prestige 
being enhanced or even dependent upon the number and size of battleships 
kept by the nation. The days of the big ship are past. They can no longer 
operate in the face of Air Power. Carriers were a passing phase and could only 
be used when one power ruled the air and was predominant over its enemy. 
It might be said that battleships will be of use to bombard enemy coastal 
defences. I do not deny the possibility, but I do not believe that big guns will 
be needed for this purpose. It is a most uneconomical way of doing the job, 
and even if guns were needed they should not be mounted on great battleships 
costing many million pounds each.
Surely it is now clear that in the next 15 or 20 years the only big Navies 
that there can be in the world, in effective operation, would be the Navies 
of the United States and the British Empire. All must agree that we can 
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straight away eliminate America as a possible enemy. What then remains for a 
British Navy to meet? There is no Navy in the world for them to meet in the 
conventional battle of the past. There still remains the need for small naval 
vessels and submarines, to protect our own trade against submarine attack and 
to attack the trade of the enemy. But the best and most potent weapons for 
this purpose will surely be shore-based aircraft supported by destroyers and all 
types of fast naval vessels and submarines and minelayers, etc.
CO-OPERATION.
I want to turn for a moment to co-operation. Everybody has praised, and 
rightly, the co-operation in the 1939-1945 war between the three Services. 
They praised the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and it has been described, and 
rightly, as one of the most wonderful pieces of machinery. It has certainly 
been magnificently developed since it was originally started, but the basis is 
the same. I would like to point out that Lord Hankey and the Air Service had 
more to do with starting this machinery than anybody else, and I remember 
too well at the time it was hotly opposed by the Navy and the Army. Many 
even did not like the Imperial Defence College, but that is all past history 
now. I am only mentioning this to point out that sometimes co-operation does 
not come without fighting for it.
Now another point while in the subject of co-operation. I fear co-
operation must not be allowed to mean, which I feel it began to mean at the 
end of the last war, the using of a weapon which is not the most efficient for 
the job. This is not what co-operation should mean, and it is certainly 
bad organisation.
This point will undoubtedly be hotly debated, but I would ask everyone, 
IS IT NOT TRUE? Let me quote a sentence which I used in my 1943 
pamphlet dealing with the question of the Navy and co-operation. “For 
instance, when we bomb works and factories in Paris the co-operation of 
Destroyers up the river Seine would be a definite liability because of the air 
cover they would require.” In other words, here is a question of building 
and using a weapon that is really definitely a liability. The same could be 
said about battleships bombarding the coast, if Air superiority had not been 
established. The same could have been said about using land forces for 
keeping the peace in Iraq, in the hills of Rowandiz, or on the frontier of India.
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True co-operation lies in a joint study of the problem – a quite 
dispassionate study – with the object of deciding on the best tools for the job 
and how to employ them. It is much easier to work in true combination in 
the heat of war, when one has to use every available resource, than it is to sit 
round the table in cold blood, in peacetime, and to recognise that cherished 
and time-honoured ideas and weapons have become a useless expense and a 
burden on the nation.
FLEXIBILITY OF THE AIR.
The very flexibility of Air Forces makes true co-operation all the more 
essential. Air Forces, at short notice, can be switched from one sort of target 
to another and, within limits, from one type of operation to a quite different 
type. There is, therefore, a constant temptation to use them piecemeal to 
meet an immediate requirement of the moment rather than to use them on a 
long-term joint plan and to utilise their flexibility in the method of achieving a 
consistent aim which is an integral part of our Government’s policy, and of our 
strategy to implement that policy.
USE OF COASTAL AIR FORCES.
Perhaps the best example of this comes from the use to be made of our 
Coastal Air Forces. In the Mediterranean theatre there were times when the 
whole weight of our Air Forces had to be concentrated on sea operations, for 
example, in getting those rare but highly important convoys into Malta, or 
in preventing the enemy getting stores and reinforcements to North Africa. 
At another period a similar concentration of all air effort had to be made to 
help along at some critical period of a land battle. Thus a Squadron which is 
technically termed a part of our “Coastal” Air Forces would at one time be 
attacking enemy supply ships on the high sea and immediately afterwards be 
busting tanks or attacking enemy dumps and movements away behind his lines 
in the North Africa desert.
Similarly in home waters the primary task of our Coastal Command 
during a critical phase of the war was the attacking of enemy submarines at 
sea. Their strength for this task was augmented by the transfer of Bomber 
Squadrons, and even of a Bomber Operational Training Unit, to this work. 
It is known that these Bomber Units did splendid work in this role. Bomber 
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Units, an integral part of Bomber Command, played a vitally important 
part in the anti-U-boat war by their attacks on enemy shipyards and factories 
concerned with building prefabricated submarines. The anti-U-boat war 
was also materially helped by the operations of Bomber Command which 
were designed to reduce the enemy’s supplies of oil and to interfere with 
his transportation system which, of course, was used to move prefabricated 
submarine parts. Bomber Command was responsible for implementing our 
very extensive – and highly successful – programme of the air mining of 
enemy waters and focal areas.
Aircraft of Fighter Command played their part, both in achieving and 
maintaining control of the air in home waters and in special patrols and 
operations to protect focal points on the routes of our larger anti-U-boat 
aircraft, and in the protection of convoys at sea against air attack and attack by 
E-boats and other small craft.
The point of all this is the fact that the Air is one element and provides a 
clear example of the necessity for centralising the control and command of Air 
Forces which, if they are to be adequately and economically handled, must be 
under a single control in order to take immediate and full advantage of their 
great flexibility and to ensure that it is directed towards a long-term policy 
and not frittered away on minor tasks by the orders of some authority who has 
not the full picture at his disposal.
In this connection I have never seen any public assessment of the real 
part played by the Air Force in our defeat of the U-boat. I have every reason 
to believe that that share was a very much larger one and its effects were far 
more far-reaching than the public (and indeed many of our Government and 
Service leaders) have ever realised. I believe that the information we now 
possess of the latest submarine developments indicates that the problem of 
dealing with submarine attack will be even more difficult and complicated in 
the future, and that many of the points which helped the Air Force in the last 
war may not be present to the same degree in the future. I refer particularly 
to the limited under-water speed of the older U-boat and its inability to stay 
submerged for long periods. Nevertheless it is a truism that with proper 
direction the defence will find a means of overcoming these difficulties. 
Whatever that means may be, surely the principle will hold good that the 
air is the most rapid and effective method of carrying detective devices and 
destructive weapons quickly to the scene of action.
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TRAINING.
One of the most important aspects in the building up and maintaining 
of effective Air Forces is their training. The basic training required, and a 
great deal of the operational training required both for the men who fly in the 
aeroplanes and the men who maintain and service them, is the same whatever 
military function their squadrons ultimately perform. They all have the same 
element with which to compete. It is essential that they should all be imbued 
with the same doctrine, and that the doctrine should be up to date, up to the 
minute in fact, with every form of important development. That can only 
be achieved by concentrating that training in one Service and under one 
control. This is also the only economical method of training, and the cost 
will always be important, and particularly so during the years when we are 
endeavouring to get back to a state of economic solvency and stability.
We achieved this centralisation of training in 1919, and it was this 
solution which brought us immeasurably ahead of any other power in the 
quality of our training and the efficiency of our small Air Force, and which 
laid the foundations of our success during the war.
Right up to the beginning of the war we maintained this centralisation at 
least to a high degree. But there is a tendency, and has been in the latter days 
of the 1939-1945 war, for the training to be done separately and to be divided 
up again. I would ask that this be carefully watched by the authorities, or the 
duplication of overhead charges, the duplication at Headquarters and the 
waste of manpower will be colossal. In the many enquiries into this subject 
between the two world wars it was conclusively proved that it was more 
economical and efficient for the training to be done by one Service, always 
remembering, of course, that officers and men of the other Services should be 
attached to those schools and instructional places, both as staff and as pupils, 
so that knowledge is pooled and airmen of all kinds learn to think and talk in 
common terms and learn a real spirit of co-operation.
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.
Three white papers, Commands No. 6856, 6857 and 6858, on the cost 
of the three Services in the years 1941, 1942 and 1943 have recently been 
published. They are illuminating. I feel that if care is to be taken on this great 
subject of which weapon is the most economical and most efficient, we should 
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study the cost of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force. Roughly, the Army 
cost double the Air Force, and the Navy half as much again as the Air Force; 
in other words, the Air Force was about a quarter of the expense of the other 
two Services.
Yet can anyone doubt after the 1939-1945 war which weapons 
contributed most to victory.
From the past it looks as if at least double the amount of money spent 
on the Navy should be spent on the Air Force and an amount equal to that 
spent on the Army. I feel if we are not careful that in two years’ time when the 
estimates take normal shape and the aftermath of war expenditure is finished 
with, you will find unless discussion and enquiries are instituted at once, the 
Air Force estimates will again be roughly half the cost of each of the other 
Services. The results of that might well be disastrous.
CONCLUSION.
In conclusion I would like to say that I consider it essential that we 
should continue to have three Services under their Chiefs of Staffs, the Air 
Service, the Army and the Navy. The three Services should all be under their 
Secretaries of State with the Minister of Defence in control. BUT THERE 
MUST NOT BE THREE AIR SERVICES, OR EVEN TWO.
In the interests of economy and efficiency let the three Services be 
each in its own element and let them have true co-operation between them 
under the Minister of Defence, and not try to make each Service entirely 
self-contained within itself rather than in its main element, with consequent 
wasteful competition and expenditure.
Finally, I would emphasise the necessity of a carefully considered 
allocation of the available money and material between the Services and 
based on a realistic outlook of our needs in war, but particularly in those 
vital opening stages of a war. In particular I would emphasise that our main 
dangers in the future lie in the Air and if we do not devote the major part of 
our resources to developing our own strength in the Air, we cannot hope to 
survive another world conflagration.
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General H. H. Arnold, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Air 
Forces during the 1939-1945 war wrote in “The National Geographical 
Magazine” February 1946:-
AIR POWER FOR PEACE.
“…IT IS OUR OBLIGATION, NOW AND IN THE FUTURE, 
TO ORGANIZE OUR ARMED FORCES WITH THE MOST 
MODERN WEAPONS TO SECURE THE MOST POWERFUL 
STRIKING FORCE AT THE LEAST EXPENSE TO THE TAX 
PAYER.
WE MUST DO THIS, NOT TO PREPARE FOR ANOTHER 
WAR … WE MUST DO THIS TO PREVENT ANOTHER 
WAR – TO PERPETUATE PEACE…”
Many who read this paper will think I have overstated the future of Air 
Power and the effect of it on war. Before they come to this conclusion let 
them read the poem on the back page which was written nearly 200 years 
ago. There was depicted a battle of the air, also the man who wrote those 
lines anticipated the spirit of the Air Force of to-day. The youth from Britain 
showed the indomitable spirit of the Air Force of to-day when, as he hurled 
towards the ground, he clutched his opponent by the heel and carried him 
with him to his doom.
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EXTRACT FROM THE WORKS OF R. O. CAMBRIDGE, ESQ., 
WRITTEN IN THE EARLY 17OO’s  AND PUBLISHED BY HIS SON.
My swelling heart unable to restrain,
I rose, and thus addressed the list’ning train,
Behold yon matchless beast ordain’d to grace,
The rapid victor in th’ aerial race.
None from ourself that prize should bear away:
But not for triumph is this mournful day.
Far other thoughts my sorrowing hours employ,
And sad contrition holds the place of joy.
Let brisker youths their active nerves prepare,
Fit their light silken wings, and skim the buxom air.
Mov’d by my words, two youths of equal fire
Spring from the crowd, and to the prize aspire.
The one a GERMAN of distinguish’d fame:
His rival from projecting BRITAIN came.
They spread their wings, and with a rising bound,
Swift at the word together quit the ground.
The BRITON’S rapid flight outstrips the wind:
The lab’ring GERMAN urges close behind.
As some light bark, pursu’d by ships of force,
Stretches each sail to swell her swifter course,
The nimble BRITON from his rival flies,
And soars on bolder pinions to the skies.
Sudden the string, which bound his plumage, broke;
His naked arms in yielding air he shook:
His naked arms no more support his weight,
But fail him sinking from his airy height.
Yet as he falls, so chance or fate decreed,
His rival near him urg’d his winged speed,
Not unobserv’d. (despair suggest a thought)
Fast by the foot the heedless youth he caught,
And drew the’ insulting victor to the ground:
While rocks and woods with loud applause resound.
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Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Cotesworth Slessor: 
a biographical note
John Slessor is perhaps the best known British air power theorist. He was also 
a great practitioner of air power, especially known for commanding the Coastal 
Command at the height of Battle of the Atlantic. He also held the most senior 
post in the Royal Air Force towards the end of his active duty, serving as Chief 
of the Air Staff from 1950 to 1952. 
John Slessor was born on 3 June 1897. He joined the Royal Flying Corps 
during the Great War, and was awarded the Military Cross for his service. The 
last part of the war was spent in training squadrons. After the war, he tried making 
a living outside the service as well as undertaking various posts with the new air 
force. After a turbulent period, he decided on professional military service and 
graduated from the Royal Air Force Staff College in 1924. The following year he 
was given command of the Fourth (Army Co-operation) Squadron. He worked 
closely with the Army until the mid-1930s, including a four-year appointment 
to the Camberley Staff College as a lecturer. During this period he had time to 
think and write, and his thoughts on air/land operations are well captured in his 
famous book Air Power and Armies published in 1936. By the late 1930s and for 
the first stages of World War II, he served in the central organisations, first as 
Deputy and then as Director of Plans with the Air Ministry. He also served on 
the Joint Planning Committee as the Air Member. During the war, he served as 
Group Commander in Bomber Command for the first couple of years, before 
returning to the Air Ministry as Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Policy). His great 
abilities, both as a writer and in personal relations, made him the best man for 
diplomacy talks over strategy both with the Americans and Russians, as well 
as between the services. In 1943 he became Commander-in-Chief Coastal 
Command. It was his operational service which brought him most fame, as the 
tide turned under his command and the German submarine forces were pressed 
to their defensives by mid-1943. For the remainder of the war, he served as the 
Royal Air Force Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 
as well as Deputy Allied Air Commander-in-Chief in the region. John Slessor 
emerged from World War II as a greatly respected practitioner of air power. He 
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held various positions in the post-war years and served as Marshall of the Air 
Force from January 1950 until the end of his career in late 1952. 
Slessor’s post-war years as an air power theorist started with his post as 
Commandant of the Imperial Defence College in 1948. There, he had time to 
use his splendid analytical and writing skills. His book The Central Blue, published 
in 1956, is a monumental work. The book is both a personal recollection and a 
great work on air power history, not at least for the field of maritime air power. 
However, as the Cold War developed, he became greatly occupied with issues 
of nuclear strategy. From this period of his writing, we have his book Strategy for 
the West. In addition, his many lecture notes on nuclear (air) strategies which he 
delivered regularly, especially at the NATO College, are well worth studying.26 
Even after he retired from the Royal Air Force in early 1953, he very much kept 
pace with the defence debates, both in public as well as internally within the 
closed circles of the defence establishments. 
John Slessor, GCB, DSO, MC, died on 12 July 1979. 
26 His lecture notes, which were classified at the time, are available in his personal papers 
AIR 75/80, as well as from AIR 75/89, at the National Archives in London.  
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Slessor and the carriers
The question of command has always been (and probably will continue to 
be) a matter of controversy between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy, 
though Slessor was not so much occupied with this. He was very much a man 
of integration and co-operation. Still, the conflict over command once again 
haunted the two services around 1959 and influenced the tension between 
them. Therefore, a short sub-chapter has been included to describe the inter-
service rivalry over the command relationships in 1959. 
The rationale for Slessor’s four controversial essays on maritime air power 
in this book is directly related to the controversial question of new strike carriers 
for the Royal Navy in the 1960s. Therefore, a longer sub-chapter discusses 
the carrier versus land-based air power debate which haunted the Royal Air 
Force and Royal Navy from 1960 to 1966 has been written. When writing 
these controversial and provocative essays, as well as other lectures and papers, 
Slessor was often criticised by Admiral Gretton and Admiral Caspar John, as 
well as the naval historian Stephen Roskill: The essays were, in fact, extremely 
political, and therefore had to be challenged.27 
A new round of debate on the command relationships
The controversial issue of command over all maritime aircraft again came to the 
surface in 1958–1959, much as a consequence of the Soviet submarine build-up 
and the need for revitalising British and NATO anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
forces. In this case, the Admiralty was concerned over the Royal Air Force’s 
true dedication to ASW. As the Admiralty made this case,28 the Chiefs of Staff 
were asked to record their views. Simultaneously, the perennial conflict over the 
command relationships of Coastal Command and Fleet Air Arm reached the 
news. In June 1958 the Daily Mail reported how Ministry of Defence planners 
had recommended the handing over of Coastal Command to the Royal Navy, 
in an article with the headline ‘Navy Ready to Take over Coastal Command’. 
The Chiefs of Staff as a joint institution found this a challenging case and did 
not reach any agreement on this controversial question. To a large degree, they 
27 See V. Orange, Slessor (London: Grub Street, 2006), pp. 264–265. Also, copies of corre-
spondance with these naval thinkers are included in Slessor’s personal files, AIR 75/80. 
28 PREM 11/2638, Discussions on possible transfer of RAF Coastal Command to RN. 
Minute from First Sea Lord of the Admiralty to Minister of Defence, 5 December 
1958. 
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avoided entering into the inter-service rivalry between the Admiralty and the 
Air Ministry, as this could have crippled the fragile Chiefs of Staff organisa-
tion at the time.29 Subsequently, the debate evolved around the individual serv-
ices and influential individuals. The Admiralty and the First Sea Lord, Admiral 
Mountbatten, and the Permanent Secretary to the Minister of Defence, Sir 
Richard Powel, emerged as the main advocates for a full transfer of Coastal 
Command and all shore-based aircraft to the Royal Navy. 
The main naval argument was that Coastal Command was much more 
closely akin to the anti-submarine functions of the Royal Navy than to the tasks 
of the Royal Air Force. The argument dating from 1937 about the ‘inherent 
flexibility’ of the aircraft had become less important. Aircraft such as the 
Shackleton were clearly not able to fill any ‘bomber roles’. A further argument 
questioned the entire system of co-operation between two equal partners (in this 
case the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force). This was argued as ‘unsound’: 
there should be a single structure. The double set of command structures and 
leadership was both ineffective and uneconomical. The naval conclusion was 
that the Coastal Command leadership and administration could and should be 
built down. 
The Permanent Secretary to the Minister of Defence became the primary 
voice for the need for change. However, at the higher level, the political 
implication of such a dramatic organisational change was assessed to be 
too great. After being made aware of the debate on change, Prime Minister 
Macmillan wrote in a personal minute to the Minister of Defence, ‘There are 
of course powerful arguments in favour of a change. Nevertheless I do not want 
this question raised this side of the Central Election. We shall gain nothing and 
stand to lose a great deal’.30 An alternative solution of making the Commander-
in-Chief Coastal Command (CINCAIREASTLANT) subordinate to the Naval 
Commander-in-Chief (CINCEASTLANT) was subsequently suggested.31 
This would make the Royal Air Force subordinate to an Admiral, as with all 
maritime operations. 
The Defence Board and the Minister of Defence32 decided by the autumn 
of 1959 that the organisational and administrative command regime was to 
29 PREM 11/2638. Memorandum by the Chief of the Defence Staff, 8 January 1959. 
30 PREM 11/2638. Harold Macmillan to the Minister of Defence. Unknown date, early 
in 1959 (M38/59). 
31 DEFE 13/207. Directive by the Minister of Defence, 9 September 1959. Various cor-
respondence. 
32 Duncan Sandys was Minister of Defence January 1957 – October 1959; Harold Wat-
kinson was Minister of Defence October 1959 – March 1962.
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be upheld. The shore-based maritime air forces continued to form part of the 
Royal Air Force, and Coastal Command continued as a separate Royal Air Force 
Command. As for operational command,33 more influence was transferred to the 
Royal Navy. In maritime operations or exercises, the senior naval commander 
in each area, both at home and overseas, was given the authority to decide which 
operational tasks and orders shore-based maritime aircraft were to fulfill.34 
It was decided that the policy on air/sea warfare matters would continue to 
be formulated by the ‘Sea/Air Warfare Committee’, but the new turn was that 
both the posts of Chairman and Secretary of the Committee as well as any sub-
committees would be held by the Admiralty.35 The Admiralty representative 
would also be the spokesman for all maritime operations at NATO conferences 
and meetings. 
Both the Admiralty and Air Ministry agreed that the standing ‘Dickson-
Lambe Agreement’ over command relationship was out of date and in need 
of revision. They accepted the changes, and since then the organisational and 
operational command regimes have remained broadly along these lines. The 
later internal Royal Air Force changes of 1969, where Coastal Command was 
absorbed as the No. 18 (Maritime) Group into the new and greater Strike 
Command,36 did not exert much influence on the former agreements of 1946 
and 1959 between the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy. 
Carriers versus land-based air power
At the beginning of the 1960s, the relationship between the Royal Navy and 
Royal Air Force was not at its best. Great debates and inter-service rivalry 
reached a peak over the great procurements planned, namely the Polaris, TSR.2 
strike aircraft, the V/STOL fighters and medium transport aircraft, and most of 
all the question of new fleet carriers. 
By the late 1950s, the Royal Navy fleet of carriers consisted of seven ships, 
with HMS Centaur, HMS Victorious, HMS Ark Royal, HMS Eagle, and HMS 
33 DEFE 13/207. Operational Command defined as: ‘The authority granted to a com-
mander to assign missions or tasks to sub-ordinate commanders, to deploy units, to 
assign or re-assign forces and to retain or assign operational and/or tactical control as 
may be deemed necessary. It does not include administration.’ 
34 DEFE 13/207. Directive by the Minister of Defence, 9 September 1959. Also stated in 
Hansard 05.11.1959, copy within PREM 11/2638. 
35 DEFE 13/207. Directive by the Minister of Defence, 9 September 1959.
36 C. Ashworth, RAF Coastal Command: 1936-69 (Somerset: Patrick Stephens Limited, 
1992).
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Hermes as general purpose carriers.37 In addition, HMS Bulwark and HMS 
Albion recently had been converted to Commando Carriers. The carriers were 
relatively newly updated to modern standards, but the general ageing of the 
current fleet and the limitations of the existing carriers for operating modern 
and bigger jet aircraft led to the Royal Navy opting for newly designed large 
carriers. The visions and demands for new large carriers were also fuelled by the 
increased interest in the East of Suez missions. 
The question of new carriers entered the political arena in 1960. Ian Orr-
Ewing, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, argued for the case during a discussion 
in the House of Commons in November 1960: 
Four of our five operational carriers are comparatively new ships and the fifth, the 
‘Victorious’, was completely rebuilt a few years ago. They should all, therefore, be 
capable of playing a full part with the fleet until the 1970s. Nevertheless, we are 
considering the requirements of the ships which will succeed them.38 
The replacement was intended for the 1970s. The Admiralty planned from the 
beginning to build four new carriers of approximately the same size as HMS 
Eagle and HMS Ark Royal. The initial plan or proposal by the Admiralty was 
to lay down the first ship at the end of 1964 and complete the fourth by 1975. 
In its early phase this replacement programme was estimated to cost a total of 
GBP 620 million, including aircraft and all facilities.39 
The issue of new carriers, which all knew would be very expensive and 
which cast a heavy burden upon the already pressed defence budget, became 
part of the general re-examination of British military strategy. It was especially 
the Treasury that was occupied with this link. Both the Chiefs of Staff and the 
Minister of Defence still held a general preference that the HMS Victorious 
both needed to and would be replaced. In addition, it was agreed that one 
would opt for a new joint VTOL fighter/ground attack/strike/reconnaissance 
aircraft for any new carriers.40 As the carrier programme clearly would be very 
37 HMS Centaur (1953/22,000 tons), HMS Victorious (1941/1958, 30,000 tons), HMS 
Ark Royal (1955, 43,000 tons), HMS Eagle (1951/under modernisation for 1964, 
44,000 tons) and HMS Hermes (1959, 23,000 tons).
38 DEFE 7/2353, Defence policy review: modernisation of aircraft carriers, 1959–1963. 
House of Commons extract from 16 November 1960.
39 DEFE 7/2354, Replacement of aircraft carriers, 1959–1963. For a detailed essay on the 
issue of costs and technical solutions, see for instance A. Gorst, ‘CVA-01’ in Richard 
Harding ed., The Royal Navy 1930-2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2005). 
40 DEFE 7/2354, From several Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting reports and correspond-
ence from December 1961 to February 1962.  
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expensive, it would influence the economies of all of the services. Alternative 
solutions were sought, and the Royal Air Force put forward the ‘Island Strategy’ 
as an alternative to carrier task forces. 
The background to this Island Strategy may be traced back to the question 
of safe and available air-transport routes to and from the Far East, especially 
after the Suez Crisis and the imposed ‘Arab Air Barrier’.41 As the Arab countries 
denied the British over-flight rights for military aircraft, the routes had to be 
redirected around great parts of Africa. The original idea of an Island Strategy 
was thus a Transport Command issue. Air Marshall Hudleston was the man 
who came up with and fought for the concept during his post as the Vice Chief 
of the Air Staff (VCAS) from 1957 until 1962.42 The Island Strategy43 was for 
the initial years mainly an Air Ministry internal idea and topic. It was first 
communicated from the Air Ministry in 1962, after Hudleston had left the staff. 
The ideas which developed during the autumn of 1962 were far beyond what 
originally was intended with the concept of staging islands for politically safe 
air-transport links. It had thus become a direct alternative to the carrier task 
force concept. 
The general perception held by politicians and the Ministry of Defence in 
December 1961 – January 1962 was in favour of a carrier replacement for HMS 
Victorious. Yet on the sideline, the Air Ministry was awaiting an opportunity to 
halt the project. As one internal recommendation to the Chief of the Air Staff 
(CAS) before a Chiefs of Staff meeting stated: 
I would not recommend you to oppose this paper strongly, but much depends on the 
climate of opinion within your Committee. Your most effective intervention would 
probably be an indirect one in terms of ‘island strategy’ should the opportunity 
arise.44 
From the summer of 1962, and well into 1963, the Island Strategy of land-
based air power occupied much discussion within the Ministry of Defence 
41 From an interview and correspondence with Peter Hudson, December 2006. During 
this period Peter Hudson worked as Assistant Secretary at S6 (Air), Air Ministry, 1956-
57 and later as Head of Air Staff Secretariat, 1958–1961. 
42 Air Chief Marshal Sir Edmund Hudleston.1956: Chief of Staff (Air), C in C, ‘Opera-
tion Musketeer’. 16 September 1957; Vice Chief of the Air Staff. 30 April 1962: AOC in 
C, Transport Command. 
43 Sometimes called ‘the Island Stance’, or ‘the Island Stance Strategy’. 
44 AIR 8/2354, Island Strategy and the carrier force, 1962–1963. A.U.S.(A) (Quinlan) to 
C.A.S (Pike), 31 January 1962.
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and related bodies. The Island Strategy concept, or vision, was based on the 
establishment of four bases in the Indian Ocean: Aldabra, Masirah, Gan, and 
Cocos. From these islands, British military forces would be able to project 
power where needed. Mobile army troops, as well as reinforcements for 
island protection with radars and SAM systems were to be flown into the four 
islands from the British Isles. Some of the islands were to be used as ‘staging 
bases’ and those closer to a conflict would act as ‘mounting bases’. From the 
mounting bases the troops would be airlifted in by V/STOL tactical transport 
aircraft to establish airheads. The air support for these operations would come 
from strike (TSR.2) and air-air combat (V/STOL P.1154) aircraft stationed on 
some of the islands. An operation such as the Island Strategy could, according 
to the Air Ministry, be maintained independently by the Air Force for up to 
28 days.45 
The Island Strategy concept was the Royal Air Force’s proposition to 
deal with the challenges to the British policies and interests East of Suez: 
An alternative to the Royal Navy carrier replacement programme and their 
perspective of a carrier task force as the solution to British challenges East of 
Suez. However, even though the Royal Air Force proposal was less expensive, the 
Minister of Defence Peter Thorneycroft had grave doubts over the practicality 
of fighting limited wars from a distance. At the end of discussions, he supported 
the building of the carriers. The original demand for four carriers had been 
reduced to that of an agreed minimum of three fleet carriers.46 With fewer than 
three carriers, the Royal Navy would be reduced to an anti-submarine navy. 
With the global role in mind, two carriers were intended for deployments East 
of Suez, while one would be in home waters for maintenance and training.47 The 
Cabinet supported the Minister of Defence’s stand, and the first new carrier was 
agreed upon on 30 July 1963.48 However, even though the new carriers had 
been agreed upon by the Cabinet, the challenges would not ease for a long time. 
The Air Ministry and the Treasury, as well as public figures, such as Slessor, kept 
up their objections. 
45 AIR 20/11423, Future aircraft carriers and the island strategy: Admiralty/Air Ministry 
study, January–February 1963. Interim report of the CSA’s enquiry into Naval Task 
Forces, 7 February 1963.
46 DEFE 7/2354, Thorneycroft, Hansard Official Report No. 158 of 30 July 1963.
47 DEFE 7/2354, Note from meeting of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minis-
ter of Defence on Aircraft Carriers and Defence Policy, 24 July 1963. 
48 ADM 1/28639, Aircraft Carrier Programme: date for placing order for replacement for 
HMS Ark Royal, 1963.orce, 1962–1963. A.U.S.(A) (Quinlan) to C.A.S (Pike), 31 Janu-
ary 1962.
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By 1965, the wheel had turned, and the carrier programme of CVA-01 
was now on the defensive. The arguments of land-based air power, no longer 
so frequently under the name of ‘the Island Strategy’ but still with much the 
same content, gained increasing support. This was perhaps not so much because 
politicians or military strategy experts truly believed in it, but more because the 
option of land-based air power represented an economically feasible alternative 
to the costly new carriers. 
A truly devastating blow to the Royal Navy and the Fleet Air Arm came 
after the proposed and highly needed carrier replacement, the CVA-01, was of-
ficially cancelled in February 1966.49 According to this famous Defence White 
Paper, the ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966, Part I: The Defence Review’,  
the Royal Navy was intended to gain a lot more of its air power support from 
land-based aircraft. 
When reading the following essays and articles by Slessor, the British 
defence history of the 1960s should be borne in mind – in general, about the 
radical changes British defence policy and military forces saw during the 1960s 
as they were leaving the East of Suez, but more specifically the great inter-service 
rivalry that existed between the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force over strategic 
concepts and resources. The Royal Navy fought for the Carrier Task Force 
strategy and their carrier programmes, notably the CVA-01, as the solution 
to the British East of Suez challenges. The Royal Air Force, as well as Slessor, 
argued for the supremacy and cost-effectiveness of land-based air power. In 
addition, they constantly fought against the proposed new large carriers. Their 
rationale was both that of a genuine belief in the reduced cost-effectiveness 
of carrier aviation but also that such an expensive carrier programme would 
clearly have great negative implications for their budgets and position. 
49 PP, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966, Part I: The Defence Review, HMSO 
1966 (2901).
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‘The Capital Ship Complex’
Twice in this century Great Britain has been brought to the brink of 
defeat by the submarine. And in that a significant, indeed in the second World 
War the major contributory factor was the obsession of the Admiralty with 
the multi-thousand ton capital ship. It was fortunate for us that before 1939 
a similar obsession in the German Admiralty led to diversion of resources to 
monsters like Tirpitz and Bismarck, at the expense of the U-boats which in 
larger numbers would very likely have strangled us at sea while we were still 
fighting alone – as they came within measurable distance of doing 3 ½ years 
after the outbreak of war, when the U.S. were ranged on our side.
We must all of us accept some share of the responsibility for our gross 
neglect at the time to provide the anti-submarine flotillas which we should 
have known from experience only 25 years before would be literally vital. It 
was the capital ship complex, backed by the massive propaganda and ‘dining-
out power’ of the Admiralty that led even Churchill in 1937 to dismiss both 
the submarine (‘the undoubted obsolescence of the submarine’) and the 
aircraft as significant dangers to our supremacy at sea. But even after the fall 
of France the Joint Planning Committee, of which I was a member, expressed 
the view – on which Naval Staff opinion had inevitably a predominant 
influence – that U-boat activity was “likely to increase” (a vast understatement 
with the Biscay ports in German hands), but that if Italy were defeated we 
should be in an “overwhelming position” vis-à-vis Germany at sea; and that 
view was accepted by Churchill. In the section of that paper dealing with 
the requirements of the Services, more than three pages were devoted to 
capital ships (including aircraft carriers) and cruisers as compared with only 
eleven lines to destroyers and sloops – and much of that short paragraph was 
concerned with the sufferings of capital ships owing to lack of destroyers 
for their “proper function with the Fleet”. In nineteen paragraphs about the 
probable action of the enemy at sea, the word U-boat did not appear once 
– reference to A/s escorts was limited to 10 words “the need for escorting 
forces for trade protection is pressing”, but the main positive recommendation 
on Naval requirements was that the recently suspended programme of capital 
ship construction should be resumed.
Yet within a few months Churchill was pressing Roosevelt for 50 
obsolete American destroyers for convoy escort, saying that a continuance of 
shipping losses at the rate of recent weeks might well be fatal; and two years 
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later, at the end of 1942 – in which year we had lost 8 million tons of shipping 
– he and Roosevelt at Casablanca endorsed the recommendation of the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff that the defeat of the U-boat should still remain a 
first charge on our combined resources. By that time also the development of 
what was then our only offensive strategy against Germany had been set back 
by the diversion of seventeen squadrons from the Bomber offensive of the 
Battle of the Atlantic.
To this near-mortal threat to our survival the relevance of the capital ship 
was little more than marginal.
x     x     x     x     x     x
A quarter of a century later, circumstances have changed out of all 
recognition but the Naval preoccupation with the multi-thousand ton capital 
ship – or its modern equivalent with a different primary armament – remains. 
Our principal potential maritime enemy to-day has over 400 submarines 
– about the strength of the German U-boat fleet at its peak in 1943 – to 
which the Royal Navy could oppose about 60 destroyers and frigates, and a 
proportion of our 40 submarines in the hunter-killer role. But no-one now 
seriously contemplates a modernized version of 1939-45 – a prolonged war 
in which the safe and timely arrival of convoys in British ports would again 
be vital to our survival. That is just as well, because readiness for any such 
thing would be wholly beyond our resources – though of course another 
time we should have the great strength of the U.S. Navy (with their nine A/s 
carriers, some 220 destroyers and over 100 submarines) on our side from the 
beginning.
Nevertheless, the capital ship complex, if not quite so potentially lethal 
as in 1939, could still do far-reaching damage to our capacity to meet our 
strategic requirements in an age when it is more than ever vital that we 
should extract the absolute maximum of real military value out of every 
defence pound sterling. To-day our maritime strategy is concerned primarily 
with requirements East of Suez; and there our shipping would have to be 
protected over vast distances and in some dangerous narrow seas against an 
already not inconsiderable number of potentially hostile submarines (China 
28, Indonesia 6, Egypt 8), which could and probably would be supplemented 
in war by ‘volunteers’ from the Soviet Navy. It is wholly unsafe to assume 
that in another real war in the Far East our warships, transports or supply 
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ships would be granted that complete immunity from submarine or air attack 
which – by a curious unwritten agreement with the enemy – they enjoyed in 
the Korean campaign 15 years ago. Yet once again – as before 1914 and 1939 
– persuasive political pressure and relentless ‘public relations’ activity looks 
like resulting in the allocation of a high proportion of our all too slender 
defence resources to a small but enormously expensive modern capital ship 
force. This might have some relevance to a threat to our shipping from enemy 
cruisers and missile ships in certain not very likely circumstances – in which 
it is inconceivable that we should lack the support of the United States. But it 
bears virtually no relation to the much more dangerous submarine threat and, 
in fact, really has little to do with the control of sea communications at all but 
is just a seaborne extension of air power.
The question is – can we afford it, having regard to our other military 
commitments?
x     x     x     x     x     x
It was much the same kind of Naval pressure which in the middle 
thirties led, not only to the diversion of resources to battleships at the near-
fatal expense of anti-submarine forces, but also to a development more 
closely relevant to present conditions, namely the transfer of the Fleet Air 
Arm to Naval control in 1937. That was inevitable at the time, in view of the 
predominant Naval influence in Whitehall and the country as a whole, and 
the R.A.F. accepted it loyally though with scepticism. But it is instructive to 
summarise the result, to help us form a judgment about present claims for 
Naval Aviation.
By the end of the late war the Royal Navy had in commission 58 aircraft 
carriers, with their attendant escort and auxiliary vessels, and a first line 
strength in aircraft of about 1300, backed by large numbers of reserve and 
training aircraft and many shore stations of various kinds. As far as I am aware, 
this was unrelated to any considered estimate by the Chiefs of Staff of our real 
strategic requirements.
In comparison, Coastal Command of the R.A.F. comprised some 900 
shore-based aircraft, of which about half were in the anti-submarine squadrons. 
And the Admiralty constantly pressed for this strength to be increased at the 
expense of other components of the R.A.F., notably Bomber Command.
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As far as I know these two elements of air power in Hitler’s war have 
never been accurately costed. But I have not the slightest doubt that the 
proportion of our G.N.P. absorbed by the Fleet Air Arm and its carriers was 
largely in excess of that represented by Coastal Command and its shore-bases. 
Churchill himself, who was closely involved behind the scenes in the Inskip 
award of 1937, admitted three years later when he was First Lord that he “had 
not conceived how enormous was the charge involved”. It was indeed! Let us 
examine briefly the relative impact on the enemy of sea-borne aviation in that 
maritime battle on the issue of which depend our national survival and the 
capacity of our land and air forces to remain in operation; it was probably the 
most critical battle of the war, and the decisive enemy was the U-boat.
German submarines sunk during the whole war by British ship-borne 
aircraft numbered 19; those sunk by shore-based aircraft (mainly of Coastal 
Command) totalled 210; these figures exclude 18 U-boats sunk by air-laid 
mines, of which one fell to carrier-borne and the other 17 to shore-based 
aircraft; they also exclude 21 commissioned U-boats sunk in harbour by 
Bomber Command; and they take no account of more than 100 destroyed in 
course of production by Allied bombing in Germany.
It is true that the Fleet Air Arm also destroyed some enemy surface ships 
during World War II; but the R.A.F. destroyed vastly greater numbers.
All this, of course, is now ancient history; but it is a sombre commentary 
on the capital ship complex, and an enlightening background against which 
to judge the validity and probable cost of the idea, now being voiced in some 
quarters, that an increasing share in the exercise of British air power should be 
assumes by the Royal Navy.
x     x     x     x     x     x
Let us now have a look at the present-day relative economics of shore-
based and sea-borne strike capacities, using round and necessarily rather over-
simplified figures which, nevertheless, I believe do not overstate the case.
The reason for the cancellation of TSR 2 was that the element of British 
air power represented by a relatively small force of these aircraft would have 
cost the tax-payer some £750 m. capital and perhaps £30 m. a year running 
costs – say a total of rather more than £100 m. a year over a period of ten 
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years. I wonder how many of our legislators or taxpayers realize that this 
other element of air power, the Fleet Air Arm (the cost of which has attracted 
virtually no public attention), looks like letting us in over the same period for 
something not far short of 50 % more than the sum. The Royal Navy includes 
two commando ships with their complement of Marines and helicopters  and 
some thirty or forty other helicopters for the anti-submarine role carried in 
cruisers, destroyers and other miscellaneous craft, all of which are essential 
and, indeed, inadequate in numbers. But comparing like to like – strike to 
strike – and the implication is that the strike squadrons in the Fleet carriers 
should take the place to the TSR 2 replacement, the F 111A, it is a reasonably 
safe bet that the aggregate cost of the carrier programme over a 10 year 
period would be considerably more, probably something between 20% and 
30% more, than the cancelled TSR 2 force.
But, keeping in the background of our minds this figure of relative cost, 
we must forget the TSR 2, and take as a shore-based yardstick the smaller 
and cheaper numbers of the equivalent F 111A, which will cost something 
of the order of £500 million – or substantially less than half the cost of the 
carrier programme. Taking into account relative performance, especially 
range and bomb-load, one F 111A is worth on a cost-effectiveness basis three 
of the Naval strike aircraft, the Buccaneer (Mr. Healy has used the figure of 
one to five for a sortie at 900 n.m. radius); and even this favours the Naval 
aircraft because the F 111A can carry a heavy load of bombs to longer ranges 
at which the Buccaneer can not operate at all. But disregarding that, a simple 
calculation will show that, even if only the same first-line numbers of strike 
aircraft could be provided under the F 111A project as those in the actual 
strike carrier programme, the impact of the latter on the enemy would still be 
about 1/3rd of the former and would cost more than twice as much; in actual 
fact the first-line numbers of F 111A that could be provided for about £500 
million would be about twice as many.
These kind of equations contain so many variables that they can never 
be very precise; for instance, there may be occasions when in a given period it 
would be possible to make more strikes from a carrier than from shore-bases 
at greater range. But it would not be very wide of the mark to say that the cost 
per aircraft impact (the real point at issue) of the Naval air programme would 
work out at something between ten and fifteen times as much as the shore-
based F 111A project over the ten year period.
 
Innmat ny mal.indd   87 06-12-07   15:52:08

x     x     x     x     x     x
All this seems at first sight so incredible as to demand explanation. What 
are the reasons for this enormous disparity in cost-effectiveness?
     The first is the capital and running costs of these modern capital ships 
themselves – the floating airfields – excluding those of the other warships 
required to protect and support them (a point sometimes overlooked); unlike 
airfields ashore, carriers can be sunk by any enemy with a few submarines 
unless they are heavily escorted. The cost of the next replacement carrier has 
been quoted as £60 m; in the light of experience, another pretty safe bet is that 
it will actually cost nearer £100 m.
There are then the costs of maintenance and operation, including a 
large bill for oil fuel, periodical refits etc. And there is the cost of the sailors 
(including their training backing) and civilians required to operate the ships at 
sea and maintain them in harbour.
All this – be it noted – is for the carriers themselves, without taking any 
account of the purpose for which they exist, namely to carry and operate 
aircraft. It would not be very wide of the mark to say that the overall 
costs of the capital ships themselves – taking into account the modernized 
replacements which would soon be demanded, would amount to more than 
the whole cost of the force of F 111A at the strength now envisaged.
Next comes the only reason for the existence of these great grey 
ships, the lineal descendants of the battleships and battle-cruisers of our 
Imperial past, namely the aircraft they carry. These are provided by the 
Navy Department on a considerably more lavish scale in relation to first line 
strength than in the R.A.F. This is due partly to a higher wastage rate and a 
higher proportion in “non-established” use, reserves, etc; but partly also to a 
more extravagant tradition. The Navy finds it necessary to train about twice as 
many pilots as does the R.A.F. to fill a given first-line establishment. And the 
present increasing shortage of candidates for service as air crews at sea has led 
to the offer of financial inducements far higher than the R.A.F. finds necessary 
– a curious reflection in these days of economic stringency on the reluctance 
of the Navy to share this commitment with the R.A.F.
The essential core of the Fleet Carrier complements – the only thing 
which is really relevant to this argument – is the force of strike aircraft; this 
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is the only element of any real interest to an enemy. This represents on the 
average only about 40% of the aircraft carried in these monster vessels. The 
remaining 60% are on board primarily to protect the floating airfield itself 
– fighters, anti-submarine aircraft, early warning and rescue aircraft. It is 
true that some of these ancillary aircraft – the Phantom fighters – could in 
certain circumstances have some strike impact on an enemy; but this does not 
invalidate comparison because the same is true in a greater degree of several 
classes of shore-based aircraft other than the medium range bomber.
Moreover, all experience goes to prove that out of 3 carriers it is never 
safe to assume that more than 2 will be available for any one operation; indeed 
recent events have shown that even this is an optimistic estimate in some 
circumstances. That means that of the Naval Air first-line, only an average of 
some 25 to 30 Buccaneers could be counted on as available to strike an enemy; 
and that, even on the 3 to 1 basis assumed above which actually favours 
the sea-borne aircraft, is the equivalent of eight to ten F 111A – perhaps 
as many as 12 to 20, taking the ‘variables’ into account. This is another not 
unimportant factor in the cost – effectiveness analysis to which I have already 
referred.
Is it a very rewarding return for an expenditure of some £120 to £130 
million a year, and the employment of a major proportion of the Navy’s 
100,000 and 120,000 uniformed civilian personnel?
x     x     x     x     x     x
There is an amiable theory – voiced, for instance, by F.M. Montgomery 
in the House of Lords – that the carrier is the “indispensable mobile air base 
for all three Services”. Is it? Let us examine that claim a little more carefully.
It implies, inter alia, that provided we have carriers we can dispense with 
shore bases, which it is now fashionable to assume we are bound to lose away. 
How carriers and their escorts are going to be able to dispense with harbours 
and dockyards is never explained. It is quite certain that we could never afford 
the enormous Fleet Train that the Americans find necessary.
But apart from that, is it really assumed that a couple of carriers could 
provide all the air support that our land forces could require in all reasonably 
probable circumstances? One need not conjure up the very unlikely 
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contingency of our having to mount an opposed landing on a remote hostile 
shore to doubt that. Can they be relied on to be on the scene sufficiently 
quickly or, with their short endurance, to be able to remain there long 
enough? Could they provide all the air cover required for their own bases or 
those of the Army? What about the transport aircraft to carry land forces to 
the scene of operations – where are they going to land and who is going to 
protect them? How are these necessarily relatively short range aircraft going 
to deal with longer range shore-based aircraft such as the Badger bomber 
– now being supplied by the Soviets to our ill-wishers in the Middle and Far 
East? If they could not, would it be regarded as a reasonable risk to commit 
any of our forces, land, sea or air, to operations against even a second class 
enemy? 
And finally, are the carrier-borne squadrons going to do without any 
shore air bases anywhere near the area of operations – is that the experience 
of the Fleet Air Arm anywhere in the world? This is a wholly unrealistic idea; 
the Fleet Air Arm is almost as dependent on shore air bases in the vicinity of 
the area of operations as is the R.A.F. which, with the advent V/S.T.O.L., will 
become decreasingly dependent on great concrete runways. And any more 
attractive target for even a minor enemy than a carrier in dock it would be 
difficult to imagine.
 
x     x     x     x     x     x
The inescapable conclusion surely must be that, if money is no object 
as in the U.S., it is possible to make a case for having 15 strike carriers in 
commission; it is easy to make a case for having none; it is quite impossible 
to make any convincing case for having 3 – on which the unhappy British 
taxpayer is expected to spend between £2 and £3 million a week over the next 
10 years.
The answer surely lies in the application of what I regard as the only 
sound principle – that the man who fights on or under the sea should be a 
sailor; the man who fights on the ground a soldier and the man who fights 
in the air an airman, all under unified direction and control at the top. This 
is the best, indeed I think the only way to achieve real Defence economies. 
The Royal Navy to-day is as indispensable as ever; but instead of squandering 
resources on superfluous Polaris submarines and grossly uneconomic floating 
airfields, it should be really adequately manned and equipped for its proper 
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job, with surface and submarine anti-submarine craft, cruisers, destroyers, 
anti-aircraft ships, minelayers, more ships and helicopters to carry more Royal 
Marine Commandos or their Army equivalent – which at present it is not.
Inter-Service relations have improved out of all recognition since the 
Beatty/Trenchard era just after the Kaiser’s war, when I was a young officer 
on the Air Staff, but they have suffered some deterioration recently. It is the 
duty of all officers of every Service to get on with our own jobs and bend our 
energies as a team, each in our own sphere, to do the job we are paid for – to 
defend the honour, safety and welfare of our Sovereign and her Dominions.
22 August 1965
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‘The Defence Review: Air Strike 
– Seaborne or shore-based?’
The appalling cost of modern armaments has resulted, somewhat 
belatedly, in the principle of cost-effectiveness becoming the decisive factor 
in all Military estimates. The term simply means that every element of our 
military forces has to be subjected to critical analysis, to determine – in the 
context of the whole spectrum of our Military commitments and requirements 
– first whether the job for which it was designed is essential (not just desirable, 
but indispensable), and then whether that job could not be done at lower cost 
and with at least comparable efficacy by some other means.
The aim to which the Government is committed is to bring our total 
defence expenditure down to within a total of £2000 million a year at 1964 
prices by 1970. It is thus a perfectly safe assumption that, in the course of the 
recent Defence Review, probably the major question with which the Staffs 
have been confronted was whether we can any longer afford the sea-borne air 
strike force of the present programme – three strike carriers is commission 
with their air components; whether, in effect, the Fleet Air Arm can be 
justified by the principle of cost-effectiveness. 
It is generally agreed that some form of air strike force, capable of being 
deployed to meet our world-wide commitments, is indispensable. And the 
only alternative to the carrier strike force is, of course, a shore-based one.
My own assessment of this problem has led me to the conclusion that 
objective analysis of a major military problem can never have pointed to an 
answer as clear as that which should emerge from this one – namely that a 
shore-based force can meet the really essential requirements so much less 
expensively than a carrier-borne force that there should be no doubt about 
the decision. That decision, and the exact figures involved, have not yet been 
revealed; so in assessing the rather complex factor of relative costs, I have had 
to use some round and probably rather over-simplified figures which long 
experience of this problem convince me do not exaggerate the case for the 
shore-based force but which, I suspect, considerably understate it.
x     x     x     x     x     x
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The Royal Navy, of course, remains essential to our security. It is 
apparently committed, for political reasons, to the Polaris submarine 
programme. For the rest, it should be adequately equipped for its proper 
job at sea – especially with anti-submarine and anti-aircraft ships and 
commando carriers – instead of devoting the present very high proportion of 
its resources to a task which has little or nothing to do with the protection of 
sea communications is any conceivably realistic situation, but is merely a sea-
borne extension of air power.
I am sure it is not commonly realised how enormously expensive Naval 
Aviation has always been in relation to its operational effect. And an example 
from recent history is, I think, a striking illustration of what is (or should be) 
the really decisive factor affecting any air programme – namely its cost per 
aircraft/impact on an enemy.
In Hitler’s war our national survival and the ability of our land and 
air forces to remain in action depended on the outcome of the Battle of 
the Atlantic, in which the decisive enemy was the U-boat. The Royal Navy 
had 58 aircraft carriers in commission with about 1300 first-line aircraft; 
Coastal Command and the few Canadian maritime squadrons numbered 
about 750 aircraft – with, of course, their shore bases. There is no doubt 
that the proportion of Gross National Product absorbed by the former was 
considerably in excess of that devoted to the latter. But German U-boats 
destroyed at sea during the whole war in the Atlantic area by British carrier-
borne aircraft numbered 19; those by our shore-based aircraft totalled 210 
(196).*
The Fleet Air Arm also sank some enemy surface ships during World 
War II. The R.A.F. accounted for vastly greater numbers – most of them as a 
kind of diversion from other more every-day tasks; the Tirpitz, for instance, 
was sunk by the squadron of Bomber Command that had earlier breached the 
Mohne and Eder dams.
This bit of ancient history is an important background against which to 
judge the Government’s decision on the future of the Fleet Air Arm.
*The “bag” in other areas being 1-25 respectively.
x     x     x     x     x     x
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The reason for the cancellation of TSR 2 was that a force of these 
aircraft would have cost the taxpayer some £750 million capital and perhaps 
£30 million a year running costs – call it a total of about £1000 million over 
a ten year period. The carrier strike force of the 1965 programme would cost 
very considerably more than that figure over the same period.
But TSR 2 is now a dead duck. And the present proposal is to provide a 
smaller shore-based force of its replacement, the American F 111A, at a cost 
of less than half that of the carrier strike force, and comprising a good many 
more first-line super-sonic reconnaissance-bombers than there would be sub-
sonic strike aircraft in the latter.
It is thus not an unfair approximation to say that, on the oversimplified 
‘nob for nob’ basis in terms purely of value for money, the strike-carrier force 
is about 3 times as expensive as the shore-based force. But that sum does not 
take into account the factor of cost per aircraft/impact. Comparing relative 
performance – especially range and bomb-load – it is no exaggeration to 
say that one F 111A is the equivalent of two of the very efficient Buccaneers 
(Mr. Healey in the Commons has used the ratio of one to five, in one specific 
‘scenario’ involving a 900 mile radius). Thus the carrier force becomes about 
six times as expensive as the shore-based force.
But there is yet another factor. All experience proves that out of three 
carriers in commission it can never be assumed that more than two will be 
available at any one time – indeed, recent events have shown that even this 
is an optimistic estimate in some circumstances. For this reason one must 
subtract an average of at least a third from the number of carrier strike aircraft 
to be counted on as available for an operation – which brings their cost per 
aircraft/impact up to about eight to one compared with the shore-based F 
111A.
These kind of equations contain so many variables that they can never 
be very precise. On the one hand, for instance, there might be circumstances 
in which more strikes could be made within a given period from a carrier than 
from shore bases at greater range; on the other, the period in which a carrier 
can remain in action without returning to base is strictly limited. Again, the 
cost quoted for the carrier force does not include that of the indispensable 
escort vessels; but it is sometimes argued (to my mind not very convincingly) 
that these vessels are necessary whether we have a carrier force or not. An air 
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base ashore is easier for an enemy to find than a mobile sea-borne air base; but 
when the latter is found, it is far more vulnerable – and so-on.
Suffice it to say that the foregoing rough and ready calculation of relative 
cost-effectiveness is certainly conservative.
x     x     x     x     x     x
What are the reasons for this great disparity in cost-effectiveness?
The first is the capital cost of the carriers themselves – the floating 
airfields; that of the first replacement carrier has been quoted as £60 m; in the 
light of experience, it is a pretty safe bet that it would actually cost nearer £100 
m. or more. There are then the running costs of maintenance and operation, 
including a large bill for oil fuel, periodical refits etc, the cost of the sailors 
(including their training backing) and civilians required to operate the ships 
at sea and maintain them in dock. It would not be very wide of the mark to 
say that the overall cost of the carriers themselves – taking into account the 
modernised replacements which would soon be required – would amount to 
more than those of the whole shore-based force at the strength now envisaged.
Next comes the only reason for the existence of these great ships, namely 
the aircraft they carry. These are provided by the Navy Department on a 
considerably more lavish scale in relation to first-line strength than in the 
R.A.F. This is due partly to a higher wastage rate and a higher proportion 
in “non-established” use, reserves, etc. The Navy also finds it necessary to 
train about twice as many pilots as does the R.A.F. to fill a given first-line 
establishment. And the present increasing shortage of candidates for service 
as air crews at sea has led to the offer of financial inducements far higher than 
the R.A.F. finds necessary; this may have been unavoidable, but it is a curious 
reflection in these days of economic stringency on the apparent reluctance of 
the Navy to share this commitment with the R.A.F.
The essential core of the Fleet Carrier complements – the only thing 
which is really relevant to this argument – is the force of strike aircraft; this 
is the element that has the direct impact on an enemy. It represents on the 
average only about 40% of the aircraft in the carriers. The remaining 60% 
are on board primarily to protect the floating airfield itself – fighters, anti-
submarine aircraft, early warning and rescue aircraft. It is true that some 
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of these ancillary aircraft – the Phantom fighters for instance – could in 
certain circumstances have some strike impact on an enemy; but this dies not 
invalidate comparison because the same is true in a greater degree of several 
corresponding classes of shore-based aircraft which must still be provided 
whether we have a Fleet Air Arm or not.
This, it will be evident, is an important element in the greater cost per 
aircraft/impact of the carrier force.
x     x     x     x     x     x
There is a theory, voiced for instance by Field Marshal Montgomery in 
the House of Lords, that the carrier is an “indispensable mobile air base for all 
three Services”. Is it? Let us examine that claim a little more closely. 
It implies that provided we have carriers we can dispense with shore 
bases, which it is now fashionable to assume we are bound to lose anyway. 
How carriers and their escorts are going to be able to do without protected 
harbours and dockyards is never explained (incidentally a more attractive 
target for even a minor enemy than a carrier in dock is difficult to imagine); 
we could certainly not afford anything like the enormous Fleet train that 
the Americans find necessary. Anyway, can the carrier-borne squadrons do 
without any shore air bases anywhere next the area of operations – is that the 
experience of ship-borne aircraft anywhere in the world? On the contrary, the 
Fleet Air Arm is nearly as dependent on shore airfields in the same part of the 
world as the scene of action as is the R.A.F. which, when we have the F 111A 
(and still more with the advent of V/S.T.O.L.) will no longer be dependent on 
great concrete runways.
But apart from that, is it really assumed that a couple of carriers could 
provide all the air cover and support that our land forces would require in all 
reasonably probable circumstances? One need not conjure up the very unlikely 
contingency of our having to mount an opposed landing on a remote hostile 
shore to doubt that. Can carriers be relied on to be on the scene sufficiently 
quickly? Can they remain at the scene of action for as long as they may be 
required? Could they provide all the air cover needed for their own bases and 
those of the Army? What about the transport aircraft to carry land forces to the 
scene of operations – where are they to land and who is going to protect them? 
How are the relatively short-range ship-borne aircraft going to deal with 
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longer-range enemy shore based aircraft such as the Badger bomber – now 
being supplied by the Soviets to our ill-wishers in the Middle and Far East? If 
they could not, would it be regarded as a reasonable risk to commit any of our 
forces – land, sea or air – to operations against even a second class enemy?
It is necessary to add that the R.A.F. has recently proved that it can 
deploy a strike force from England ready for action in the Far East within 48 
hours of the word go – without any preliminary warning. And it is difficult to 
imagine circumstances in which a modern shore-based force, with its airborne 
maintenance echelons, would be unable to reach a scene of action – even if 
Aden were no longer available.
x     x     x     x     x     x
What surely emerges from all this is that, if money is no object as in the 
United States, it is possible to make a case for having fifteen strike carriers in 
commission; it is easy to make a case for having none; what seems to me quite 
impossible is to make a case for having three – on which the unfortunate tax-
payer would have to spend between £2 million and £3 million a week over the 
next 10 years.
The answer surely lies in the application of what I regard as the only 
sound principle – that the man who fights on or under the sea should be a 
sailor, the man who fights on the ground a soldier and the man who fights in 
the air an airman, all under unified direction and control at the top. That is the 
best, indeed I think the only way to achieve real Defence economics. Relations 
between the Services have improved out of all recognition since the Beatty/
Trenchard era just after the Kaiser’s war when I was a young officer on the Air 
Staff; but they have suffered some deterioration recently. It is no use blaming 
this on ‘the politicians’. These inter-Service controversies have their roots in 
the fact – maybe distasteful in its implications but nevertheless inescapable - 
that to-day, if we are to meet our world-wide strategic responsibilities, we have 
no choice but to squeeze the ultimate farthing’s worth of real military value out 
of every pound in the Defence estimates. That being me, it is the duty of all 
officers of every Service to get on with their own jobs and bend their energies 
as a team, each in his own sphere, to do the job they are paid for – to defend 
the safety, honour and welfare of our Sovereign and her Dominions.
14 October ‘65
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‘Air Power – Seaborne or Shore-based?’
In these days it is more than ever essential that every element of our 
Military strength should be subjected to critical analysis, to determine – in the 
context of the whole spectrum of our commitments and requirements – first, 
whether the job for which it was designed is essential (not just desirable, but 
indispensable), and then whether that job could not be done at lower cost 
and with at least comparable efficacy by some other means. It was therefore 
inevitable that a major question for consideration in the course of the Defence 
Review should have been whether the sea-borne air strike force of the 1965 
programme – three strike carriers in commission, with their air complements 
– is commensurate with the high cost involved.
The Royal Navy clearly remains vitally important, and must be 
adequately equipped for its proper job at sea – which at present it is not. But 
the conditions for which we have now to provide are not those of previous 
wars; and anyway the role of the strike carriers  has little or nothing to do 
with the protection of sea communications, but is almost entirely a sea-borne 
extension of air power.
There is no disagreement about the need for shore-based strike capacity, 
available for our Nato commitments as now, and capable of being deployed to 
meet our obligations East of Suez. The question is whether we must have sea-
borne air power in addition; to which the answer must be sought in ruthless 
and unsentimental cost-analysis.
The recommendations on that subject in the Defence Review and the 
detailed costs involved, have not been officially revealed. In arriving at my 
own conclusion that shore-based squadrons can meet the really essential 
requirements much less expensively than a Carrier force, I have had to use 
some round figures which, I am satisfied, do not overstate the case.
I am sure it is not commonly realized how expensive Naval Air has 
always been in relation to its operational effect. In World War II, for 
example, our survival and the ability of our fighting Services to go on 
fighting depended on the outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic, in which the 
decisive enemy was the submarine. The Royal Navy had 58 carriers with 
1290 first-line aircraft; the Maritime aircraft of the R.A.F. and Dominion Air 
Forces, world wide, numbered under 1000. Enemy submarines sunk at sea 
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throughout the war in the Atlantic area numbered 19 by the Fleet Air Arm 
and 196 by shore-based aircraft – the bag in other theatres being 1 and 25 
respectively.
Carrier-borne aircraft also sank some enemy surface ships during the 
war. The R.A.F. sank vastly greater numbers, many as a diversion from other 
tasks; Tirpitz, for instance, was destroyed by a squadron of Bomber Command 
that had earlier breached the Mohne dam.
This bit of not so ancient history throws a revealing light on what will no 
doubt be an important factor in any decision on the future of the carrier force 
– its cost per aircraft/impact on an enemy.
COST-EFFECTIVENESS
The reason for the cancellation of TSR 2 was that a force of these 
aircraft would have cost the taxpayer some £750 million capital and perhaps 
£30 million a year running costs – a total of about £1000 million over a ten 
year period. The carrier strike force of the 1965 programme would cost very 
considerably more than that figure over the same period – not counting the 
cost of the indispensable escort vessels. 
But TSR 2 is, alas, now a dead duck. And the present proposal is to 
provide in its place a smaller force of the American F 111 A, at a cost of less 
than half that of the carrier strike force over the same period, and comprising 
substantially more first-line super-sonic reconnaissance-bombers than there 
would be trans-sonic strike aircraft in the latter.
So it is a fair approximation to say that, in terms purely of ‘hardware’ 
value for money the strike-carrier force is about 3 times as expensive as the 
shore-based force.
But that does not take into account the factor of cost per aircraft/impact. 
Comparing relative performances – especially range and bomb-load – it is fair 
to say that one F.111A is the equivalent of more than two of the very effective 
Buccaneers (Mr. Healey in the Commons had used the ratio of one to five, in 
one specific ‘scenario’ involving a 900 mile radius). On this basis the carrier 
strike becomes about six times as expensive as the shore-based. 
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All experience proves, moreover, that out of three carriers in commission 
one can never count on more than two being available at any time – indeed, 
recent events have shown that even this is an optimistic estimate. For this 
reason we must subtract an average of at least a third from the number of strike 
aircraft available for an operation – which brings the cost per aircraft/impact 
up to something like eight to one compared with the shore-based F.111A. 
These kind of equations contain so many variables that they can never 
be very precise. There might, for instance, be circumstances in which more 
strikes could be made within a given period from a carrier than from shore 
bases at greater range; on the other hand, the period in which a carrier can 
remain in action without returning to base is strictly limited. But I believe the 
foregoing rough and ready calculation of relative cost-effectiveness to be on 
the conservative side. 
CARRIER COSTS
What are the reasons for this great disparity in cost-effectiveness? 
The first is the capital cost of the carriers themselves – which have to be 
replaced by new ones from time to time; that of the first replacement carrier 
has been quoted as £60M, but in the light of experience it is a pretty safe 
bet that it would actually cost £100M or more. There are then the running 
costs of maintenance and operation, including large sums for oil fuel and 
periodical refits, and the cost of the sailors and civilians required to operate 
the ships at sea and maintain them in dock. It would not be very wide of the 
mark to say that the overall costs of the carriers themselves ever the ten year 
period would amount to more than those of the whole shore-based force now 
envisaged. 
Next comes the only reason for the existence of these great ships, 
namely the aircraft they carry. These are provided by the Navy Department 
on a higher scale in relation to first line strength than in the R.A.F. This is 
due partly to higher wastage rate, a bigger proportion in reserve and other 
reasons. The Navy also finds it necessary to train many more pilots than does 
the R.A.F. to fill a given first-line establishment; and the present increasing 
shortage of candidates for service as air crew at sea has led – perhaps 
unavoidably but regrettably – to the offer of financial inducements higher 
than the R.A.F. finds necessary. 
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The essential core of the strike Carrier complements – the only thing 
which is really relevant to this argument – is the establishment of strike 
aircraft; this is the element that has the direct impact on an enemy. But on 
the average less than 30% of the carrier’s component of aircraft could be 
available for this task. All the fighters, some of the strike aircraft, the early 
warning aircraft and the anti-submarine helicopters would be required for 
the protection of the ships itself. It is true that some of these aircraft – the 
Phantom fighters for instance – could in certain circumstances have some 
strike impact on an enemy; but this does not invalidate comparison because 
the same is true of similar shore-based aircraft which must still provided 
whether we have a carrier force or not. 
This, it will be evident, is an important element in the greater cost per 
aircraft/impact of the sea-borne strike. 
OVERSEA BASES
Is there any factor that makes a carrier force indispensable, despite its 
costs?
There is a popular theory that provided we have carriers we can dispense 
with shore bases. How carriers and their escorts are going to be able to do 
without protected harbours and dockyards is not apparent (incidentally a more 
attractive target for even a minor enemy than a carrier in dock is difficult 
to imagine); we could certainly not afford anything like the enormous Fleet 
Train that the Americans find necessary. 
Our plans are not concerned with opposed landings on remote hostile 
coasts, for which sea-borne Air could be valuable in the initial stages. 
Assuming the more realistic requirement, the ability to respond to a request 
for help from a Commonwealth partner or ally East of Suez, is it really 
supposed that a couple of carriers could provide all the air support that 
our land forces would require in all reasonably probable circumstances? 
Could they provide the necessary air cover for the army ashore as well as 
for themselves? Can carriers be relied on to arrive on the scene sufficiently 
quickly? Can they remain in action for as long as they may be required? What 
about the transport aircraft to carry land forces to the scene of operations 
– where are they to land and who is going to protect them? How would 
relatively short-range Naval strike aircraft counter the longer range shore-
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based bombers such as the Badger, now being supplied by Russia to our 
ill-wishers in the Middle and Far East? If they could not, would it be an 
acceptable risk to commit any of our forces – land, sea or air – to operations 
against even a second-rate enemy? 
In point of fact, the Fleet Air Arm is not much less dependant on airfields 
ashore in the same part of the world as the scene of action than the R.A.F. 
which, when we have the F.111 (and still less with the advent of V/STOL), will 
not be dependant on great concrete run-ways. 
I should add that the R.A.F. has recently proved that it can deploy a 
strike force from England ready for action in the Far East within 48 hours 
of the word Go – without any preliminary warning. And it is difficult to 
imagine conditions in which a modern shore-based force, with its airborne 
maintenance echelons, would be unable to reach 
a scene of action – even if Aden were no longer available. 
Of course, if there were no bases overseas that we could use, then we 
could not operate East of Suez at all. 
CONCLUSION
The answer to all this lies in the application of the only sound principle 
– that operations on or under the surface of the sea should be the job of the 
Navy, those on land that of the Army and those in the air the responsibility 
of the R.A.F. That is the best, indeed I think the only way to achieve real 
economies in the Defence field. It is a concept that inevitably gives rise to 
controversies; but these have their roots in the fact – maybe unwelcome in 
its implications but inescapable – that today, if we are to fulfil our world-
wide strategic responsibilities, we have no choice but to squeeze the ultimate 
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‘Naval Air Power – is it worth it?’
The current examination of our defence policy and requirements has 
brought into the open the more extreme elements among the protagonists of 
Naval Aviation, who have even gone so far as to describe as “the paramount 
question for the future of our armed forces – do we any longer require a 
separate Air Force?” I deplore these public, and necessarily incompletely 
informed, Inter-Service controversies – the whole trend of modern defence 
organisation is opposed to this kind of narrow sectionalism. But that sort 
of consideration has never had much effect on the extreme Naval school 
of thought, and open attacks on the R.A.F. cannot be allowed to stand 
unanswered. Moreover it is important that the public – who, after all, have to 
foot the bill – should be aware of what all this is about, and know some salient 
facts about sea-borne air power which may surprise them.
It was much the same kind of Naval pressure which led to the transfer of 
the Fleet Air Arm from R.A.F. to Naval control in 1937. That was inevitable 
at the time, in view of the predominant Naval influence in Whitehall and the 
country as a whole, and the R.A.F. accepted it loyally though with regret. But 
it is instructive to summarise the result, to help us form a judgement about 
present claims for Naval Aviation.
By the end of the late war the Royal Navy had in commission 58 aircraft 
carriers, with their attendant escort and auxiliary vessels, and a first line 
strength in aircraft of about 1300, backed by large numbers of reserve and 
training aircraft and many shore stations of various kinds. As far as I am aware, 
this was unrelated to any considered estimate by the Chiefs of Staff of our real 
strategic requirements.
In comparison, Coastal Command of the R.A.F. comprised some 
900 shore-based aircraft, of which about half were in the anti-submarine 
squadrons. And the Admiralty constantly pressed for this strength to be 
increased at the expense of other components of the R.A.F., notably Bomber 
Command.
As far as I know these two elements of air power in Hitler’s war have 
never been accurately costed. But I have not the slightest doubt that the 
proportion of our G.N.P. absorbed by the Fleet Air Arm and its carriers 
was largely in excess of that represented by Coastal Command and its 
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shore-bases. Let us examine briefly their relative impact on the enemy in 
that maritime battles on the issue of which depended our national survival 
and the capacity of our land and air forces to remain in operation; it was 
probably the most critical battle of the war, and the decisive enemy was the 
U-boat.
German submarines sunk during the whole war by British ship-borne 
aircraft numbered 19; those sunk by shore-based aircraft (mainly of Coastal 
Command) totalled 210; these figures exclude 18 U-boats sunk by air-laid 
mines, of which one fell to carrier-borne and the other 17 to shore-based 
aircraft; they also exclude 21 commissioned U-boats sunk in harbour by 
Bomber Command; and they take no account of more than 100 destroyed in 
course of production by Allied bombing in Germany.
It is true that the Fleet Air Arm also destroyed some enemy surface ships 
during World War II; but the R.A.F. destroyed vastly greater numbers.
This, of course, is now ancient history, but it is an enlightening 
background against which to judge the validity and probably cost of the claim 
that the exercise of British air power should now be handed over to the Royal 
Navy – with, no doubt, more useful assistance on the side from an Army Air 
Arm.
x     x     x     x     x     x
Let us now have a look at the present-day relative economics of shore-
based and sea-borne strike capacities, using round and necessarily rather over-
simplified figures which, nevertheless, I believe do not overstate the case.
The reason for the cancellation of TSR 2 was that the element of British 
air power represented by a relatively small force of these aircraft would have 
cost the taxpayer some £750 m. capital and perhaps £30 m. a year running 
costs – pay a total of £100 m. a year over a period of ten years. I wonder how 
many of our legislators or taxpayers realise that this other element of air 
power, the Fleet Air Arm (which has attracted virtually no public attention), 
looks like letting us in over the same period for something not far short 
of twice that amount. This includes the cost of two commando ships with 
their complement of Marines and helicopters and some thirty or forty other 
helicopters for the anti-submarine role carried in cruisers, destroyers and 
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other miscellaneous craft, the need for which no-one should challenge. But 
comparing like for like, and the implication is that the strike squadrons in 
the Fleet carriers should take the place of the TSR 2 replacement, the F 
111A, it is a safe bet that their aggregate cost over a 19 year period would be 
considerably more – probably something of the order of 30 % more – than 
the cancelled TSR 2 force.
But, keeping in the background of our minds this figure of relative cost, 
we must forget the TSR 2, and take as a shore-based yardstick the smaller 
and cheaper number of the equivalent F 111A, which will cost something 
over £500 million – or substantially less than half the cost of the Fleet carrier 
programme. Taking into account relative performance, especially range and 
bomb-load, it is no overstatements to assert that on a cost-effectiveness basis 
one F 111A is worth 3 of the Naval strike aircraft, the Buccaneer (Mr. Healy 
has used the figure of one to five for a sortie at 900 n.m. radius), and even 
this favours the Naval aircraft, since the F 111A can carry a heavy load of 
bombs to longer ranges at which the Buccaneer can not operate at all. But 
disregarding that, a simple calculation will show that, even assuming that only 
the same first-line numbers of strike aircraft could be provided under the F 
111A project as those in the actual strike carrier programme, the impact of 
the latter on the enemy would still be about 1/3rd of the former and would 
cost more than twice as much; in actual fact the first-line numbers of F 111A 
that could be provided for less than £600 million would be more than twice as 
many; so the cost per aircraft impact (the real point at issue) of the Naval air 
programme would work out at about 15 times as much as the shore-based F 
111A project over the ten year period.
x     x     x     x     x     x
All this seems at first sight so incredible as to demand explanation. What 
are the reasons for this enormous disparity in cost-effectiveness?
The first is the capital and running costs of the strike carriers themselves 
– the floating airfields – excluding those of the other warships required to 
protect and support these airfields (a little matter sometimes overlooked); 
unlike airfields ashore, carriers can be sunk by any enemy with a few 
submarines unless they are heavily escorted. The cost of the next replacement 
carrier has been quoted as £60 m. In the light of experience, another pretty 
safe bet is that it will actually cost nearer £100m.
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There are then the costs of maintenance and operation, including a 
large bill for oil fuel, periodical refits etc. And there is the cost of the sailors 
(including their training backing) and civilians required to operate the ships at 
sea and maintain them in harbour.
All this – be it noted – is for the carriers themselves, without taking any 
account of the purpose for which they exist, namely to carry and operate 
aircraft. It would not be very wide of the mark to say that the overall costs of 
the strike-carrier squadrons, equipped with the new floating airfields which 
would soon be required, would amount to more than the whole cost of the 
force of F 111A at the strength now envisaged.
Next comes the real reason for the existence of these great grey ships, 
which look so glamorous on the television and conjure up nostalgic memories 
of our Imperial past; namely the aircraft they carry. These are provided by the 
Navy Department on a considerably more lavish scale in relation to first line 
strength than in the R.A.F. This is due partly to a higher wastage rate and a 
higher proportion in “non-established” use, reserves, etc; but partly also to a 
more extravagant tradition. The Navy finds it necessary to train about twice 
as many pilots as does the R.A.F. to fill a given first-line establishment. And 
the present increasing shortage of candidates for service as Naval air crews is 
giving rise to claims for financial inducements far higher than the R.A.F. finds 
necessary – a curious reflection on the suggestion that the R.N. should now 
assume the residual responsibilities of the R.A.F.
The essential core of the Fleet Carrier complements – the only thing 
which is really relevant to this argument – is the force of strike aircraft; 
this is the only element of any interest to an enemy. This represents on the 
average only about 40% of the aircraft carried in these monster vessels. The 
remaining 60% are on board to protect the floating airfield itself – fighters, 
anti-submarine aircraft, early warning and rescue aircraft.
Moreover, all experience goes to prove that out of 3 carriers it is never 
safe to assume that more than 2 will be available for any one operation; indeed 
recent events have shown that even this is an optimistic estimate in some 
circumstances. That means that of the Naval first-line, only an average of 
some 25 to 30 Buccaneers could be counted on as available to strike an enemy; 
and that, even on the 3 to 1 basis assumed above which actually favours the 
sea-borne aircraft, is the equivalent of eight to ten F 111A. This is another not 
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unimportant factor in the cost-effectiveness analysis to which I have already 
referred. 
Is this a very rewarding return for an expenditure of some £120 to £130 
million a year, and the employment of a major proportion of the Navy’s 
100,000 uniformed and 120,000 civilian personnel?
x     x     x     x     x     x
There is an amiable theory – voiced, for instance, by F.M. Montgomery 
in the House of Lords – that the carrier is the “indispensable mobile air base 
for all three services”.        Is it?     Let us examine that claim a little more 
carefully.
It implies, inter alia, that provided we have carriers we can dispense with 
shore bases, which it is now fashionable to assume we shall lose anyway. How 
carriers and their escorts are going to be able to dispense with harbours and 
dockyards is never explained. Could we ever afford the enormous Fleet Train 
that the Americans find necessary?
But apart from that, is it really assumed that a couple of carriers could 
provide all the air support that our land forces could require in all reasonably 
probable circumstances? One need not conjure up the very unlikely 
contingency of our having to mount an opposed landing on a remote hostile 
shore to doubt that. Can they be relied on to be on the scene sufficiently 
quickly or, with their short endurance, to be able to remain there long 
enough? Could they provide all the air cover required for their own base or 
those of the Army? What about the transport aircraft to carry land forces to 
the scene of operations – where are they going to land and who is going to 
protect them? How are these necessarily relatively short range aircraft going 
to deal with longer range shore-based aircraft such as the Badger bomber 
– now being supplied by the Soviets to our ill-wishers in the Middle and Far 
East? If they could not, would it be regarded as a reasonable risk to commit 
any of our forces, land, sea or air, to operations against even a second class 
enemy?
And finally, are the carrier-borne squadrons going to do without any 
shore air bases anywhere near the area of operations – is that the experience 
of the Fleet Air Arm anywhere in the world? This is a fantastically unrealistic 
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idea; the Fleet Air Arm is almost as depend on shore air bases in the vicinity of 
the area of operations as is the R.A.F. And any more attractive target for even 
a minor enemy than a carrier in dock it would be difficult to imagine.
However, even the most extreme Naval protagonist would hardly claim 
that we need no shore-based squadrons. The basic idea obviously is that we 
should put the clock back half a century, split up the R.A.F. between the Navy 
and Army, and have a grant Naval Air Force centred on the carrier. Of that 
I can only say that nothing in my 50 years in the Air Service gives me any 
reason to imagine that anything of the kind would conduce either to economy 
or to military effectiveness. On the contrary, there is not the slightest doubt 
that exactly the reverse would be the result. It is, moreover, a proportion that 
public opinion would nor for a moment be willing to accept.
x     x     x     x     x     x
The inescapable conclusion, I feel bound to say, is that Naval Aviation is 
and always has been the most extravagant and least generally effective form of 
fighting force ever yet devised. If money is no object, as in the U.S., it is just 
possible to make a case for having 15 strike carriers in commission; it is very 
easy to make a case for having none; it is quite impossible to make any sort of 
case for having 3 – on which the unhappy British taxpayer is expected to spend 
getting on for £3 million a week over the next 10 years.
I know of no R.A.F. officer who would subscribe to any such asinine 
suggestion as that we do not need a ‘separate’ Navy; this sort of talk is really 
insufferable clap-trap in this day and age.
What I want to see is the application of what I regard as the only sound 
principle – that the man who fights on or under the sea should be a sailor, 
the man who fights on the ground a soldier and the man who fights in the air 
an airman, all under unified direction and control at the top. This is the best, 
indeed I think the only way to achieve real Defence economics. But we must 
have a Navy that, instead of squandering resources on superfluous Polaris 
submarines and grossly uneconomic floating airfields, is really adequately 
manned and equipped for its proper job, with surface and submarine anti-
submarine craft, cruisers, destroyers, anti-aircraft ships, minelayers, more 
ships and helicopters to carry more Royal Marine Commandoes or their Army 
equivalent – which at present the Royal Navy is not.
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Ever since the Beatty/Trenchard era just after the Kaiser’s war, when I 
was a young officer on the Air Staff, the Blue Water school has been trying to 
abolish the R.A.F. For pity’s sake let us have an end to this dangerous nonsense 
and bend our energies as a team, each in our own sphere, to do the job we are 
paid for – to defend the honour, safety and welfare of our Sovereign and her 
Dominions.
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